:.NRLF 


DEC  29 


tZDtie  Wini\itvsiitp  of  Chicago 


STUDIES  IN  THE  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  LANGUAGE 

I.  THE  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  SAMENESS  OF  SPEECH 

SOUNDS 

II.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  IMITATION  IN  SPEAKING 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  ;4lV£^^  1/ 


OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  ARTS  AND  LITERATURE 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


DEPARTMENT  OF  COMPARATIVE  PHILOLOGY 


BY 

Karl  Friedrich  Muenzinger 


Private  Edition,  Distributed  by 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 
1918 


C{)e  Wini\ittsiitp  of  Cfitcaso 


STUDIES  IN  THE  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  LANGUAGE 

I.  THE  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  SAMENESS  OF  SPEECH 

SOUNDS 

II.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  IMITATION  IN  SPEAKING 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO  THE  FACULTY 

OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  ARTS  AND  LITERATURE 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


DEPARTMENT  OF  COMPARATIVE  PHILOLOGY 


BY 

Karl  Friedrich  Muenzinger 


Private  Edition,  Distributed  by 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 

1918 


Note  :  I  wish  to  express  my  gratitude  to  my  teachers,  Dean  J.  R.  Angell,  Professor 
G.  H.  Mead,  Professor  E.  Prokosch,  Professor  F.  A.  Wood,  and  especially  to  Professor 
C.  D.  Buck  for  their  assistance  and  guidance  in  the  preparation  of  these  studies.  To 
the  latter  I  owe  above  all  a  scientific  introduction  to  the  complexity  of  the  problems 
of  sound  change,  two  of  which  are  approached  here  from  a  psychological  point  of  view. 

K.  F.  M. 

June,  1918. 


A.  THE  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  SAMENESS  OF 
SPEECH  SOUNDS 


The  articulation  of  a  speaking  person  produces  certain  acoustic 
phenomena,  a  'speech  continuum,'  of  which  we  may  get  an  objective 
record  on  a  phonograph  or  grammophone.  If  we  examine  an  enlarged 
transcription  of  such  a  record^  we  are  surprised  to  find  how  the 
smallest  elements  vary  continually,  how  their  characteristics  change 
by  a  gradual  shading  into  each  other,  and  how  impossible  it  seems 
at  first  to  mark  off  larger  units  representing  what  we  call  sounds  and 
words.  And  yet  a  person  hearing  a  speech  continuum  will  have  no 
difficulty  in  distinguishing  sounds  and  words,  provided  the  speaker 
belongs  to  the  same  speech  community.  We  must  suppose  that  the 
stimulation  produced  at  the  auditory  receptor,  the  ear,  corresponds 
closely  to  the  speech  continuum.  How  is  it  then  that  what  the 
hearer  perceives  is  not  a  sound  continuum,  but  sounds  and  words? 

A  'perception'  we  are  ususally  informed  is  a  compound  of  an  im- 
mediate stimulation  plus  some  past  experience.  Such  a  definition, 
however,  does  not  do  justice  to  the  'meaning'  of  a  perception,  or 
in  other  words  to  its  function  as  a  part  of  a  larger  psychic  process. 
What  is  necessary  to  admit  in  the  definition  of  perception  beside 
the  reference  to  the  past  is  a  reference  to  the  future.  This  is  con- 
tained in  Professor  Mead's  conclusion  that  "percepts  ....  are 
compounds  of  the  experience  of  immediate  stimulation  and  the  im- 
agery of  response  to  which  the  stimulation  will  lead.  The  object  can 
be  properly  stated  in  terms  of  conduct."^  That  is,  to  illustrate,  the 
pencil  here  by  my  side  is  never  a  mere  pencil;  it  is  usually  a  pencil 
to  write  with,  but  it  may  also  be  an  object  to  keep  a  certain  place  in 
a  book,  or  various  other  instruments  which  the  situation  calls  for. 
This  functioning  of  the  "imagery  of  the  response  to  which  the  stimu- 
lation will  lead"  is  determined,  so  it  seems  to  me,  by  the  present 
conscious  attitude.     Not  any  random  past  experience  may  merge 

*  Scripture,  E.  W.,  Elements  of  Experimental  Phonetics,  Plate  I;  cp.  also  Muen- 
zinger,  K.  F.,  A  New  Apparatus  for  the  Enlargement  of  Phonographic  Records,  Bull. 
Univ.  Texas,  1915,  No.  24,  Plates  II  and  III. 

*  Mead,  G.  H.,  Jour.  Phil.  Psych,  and  Sc.  Meth.,  X,  401. 

1 


2.\  :  :  .;  •*;  .S.xudje&in  t-he  Psychology  of  Language 

with  the  sensation,  but  whatever  is  selected  must  fit  somehow  into 
the  present  situation  and  its  bearing  upon  the  future.  In  order  to 
bring  out  this  relation  to  the  future  more  clearly,  one  ought  to  speak 
of  the  direction  of  an  attitude. 

The  problem  becomes  immensely  compUcated  if  the  percept  is  an 
element  of  a  larger  process,  where  it  is  partly  merged  with  the  sur- 
rounding elements,  and  where  the  process  is  perceived  as  a  unit  and 
in  return  leads  to  a  response  of  similar  complexity,  as  is  the  case  in  the 
conversation  of  two  persons.  And  yet  it  seems  to  me  that  Professor 
Mead's  interpretation  must  and  can  still  be  applied  to  the  elements 
of  the  process.  We  must  conceive  of  the  total  response  to  a  social 
situation  as  prepared  by  and  composed  of  a  number  of  minor  re- 
sponses that  are  all  merged  in  that  total  response  which  alone  stands 
out  with  a  distinct  unity. 

Let  us  suppose  that  in  a  conversation  one  sentence  uttered  by  one 
person  calls  out  a  response  by  another  also  in  the  form  of  a  sentence. 
The  process  going  on  in  this  second  person  must  represent  something 
like  this.  The  attitude  created  by  perceiving  the  first  sentence  is 
what  we  usually  call  the  meaning  or  the  contents  of  the  sentence. 
This  attitude  is  modified  by  other  processes  going  on  in  the  listener's 
consciousness,  imagery  of  past  experience,  present  stimulation  other 
than  those  speech  sounds,  and  finally  the  social  situation  thus 
created  leads  to  the  response  of  uttering  another  sentence.  What 
is  commonly  termed  an  "expression  of  thinking"  is  in  terms  of  conduct 
a  response  to  a  social  situation.  Just  before  the  utterance  takes 
place  the  attitude  represents  what  Wundt  calls  the  Gesamtvorstellung, 
whose  elements  are  to  appear  in  the  following  analytic-synthetic 
process  of  speaking.  The  perception  of  the  words  and  sounds  while 
hearing  the  sentence  is  a  process  secondary  in  importance  to  the 
process  of  perceiving  the  meaning.  This  is  sometimes  expressed  by 
stating  that  our  attention  is  primarily  directed  towards  the  meaning 
of  a  sentence. 

The  hearer  listening  as  the  speaker  produces  the  speech  continuum 
by  his  articulation  could  at  any  moment  reproduce  most  of  the  words 
he  had  heard  so  far,  although  the  sentence  stimulates  him  as  a  unit. 
And  yet  the  perception  of  the  words  is  not  the  primary  object  of  the 
process  of  listening;  it  is  the  meaning  of  the  sentence  which  is  to  be 
received.  This  meaning  is  synthesized  through  whatever  the  words 
impart. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  3 

The  fact  that  the  speech  continuum  is  split  up,  so  to  speak,  into 
words  is  on  the  one  hand  due  to  that  past  experience  which  had 
a  similar  sound  sequence  as  a  unit  of  stimulation  followed  by,  or 
rather  determine  by,  a  unit  of  response.  This  is  exemplified  by 
listening  to  utterances  in  a  foreign  tongue  in  which  one  has  only  a 
limited  vocabulary.  It  is  often  impossible  then  to  say  how  many 
words  one  has  heard,  on  account  of  the  unfamiliarity  of  certain 
sound  combinations.  On  the  other  hand  the  analysis  is  also  due  to 
the  direction  of  the  attitude,  or  the  'context'  here,  which  selects 
with  reference  to  the  future.  Our  punsters  make  use  of  the  excep- 
tional situations  where  the  attitude  may  have  two  possible  directions. 

The  uncertainty  that  sometimes  exists  as  to  whether  we  shall 
write  an  expression  as  German  zustandekommen  in  one,  two  {zustande 
kommen),  or  three  words  {zu  stande  kommen)  does  not  disprove  the 
existence  of  separate  words,  but  rather  adds  some  value  to  our 
principle.^  The  entire  expression  zustandekommen  answers  to  one  dis- 
tinct meaning,  i.e.,  calls  out  a  single  response.  Since  the  parts  stande, 
zu,  and  kommen  have  also  appeared  time  and  again  as  separate  and 
distinct  bearers  of  meaning,  they  have  some  independence  which 
expresses  itself  in  the  uncertainty  of  the  convention  of  writing.  The 
units  of  responses  next  to  the  sentence  are  the  phrases,  and  these 
again  contain  the  words  as  smaller  units.  The  degree  of  independence 
of  the  smaller  units  is  not  a  fixed  quantity,  but  varies  according  to 
the  context  and  sentence  accent.  The  adjective  blue  is  more  indepen- 
dent in  the  phrases  a  blue  dress,  a  blue  sky  than  in  a  bliiebird,  or  a 
blue  print,  whether  convention  makes  us  write  the  latter  in  three 
words  or  in  two,  a  blueprint. 

Considered  as  a  sound  experience  the  word  appears  to  be  the  same 
under  different  circumstances,  i.e.,  at  different  times,  in  different 
sentences,  or  if  spoken  by  different  persons.  This  means,  expressed 
in  term  of  conduct,  that  our  reaction  to  it  as  far  as  its  physical 
nature  is  concerned,  its  phonetic  material,  is  the  same,  since  it  is  the 
reaction  which  determines  the  perception.  Compared  objectively, 
the  parts  of  the  speech  continuum  which  we  mark  oflf  as  representing 
the  'same'  words  are  sometimes  quite  varied  in  appearance,  but  in 
our  consciousness  they  are  the  same  inasmuch  as  they  have  a  func- 
tional identity.   The  problems  which  arise  in  regard  to  these  phenom- 

'  Bloomfield,  L.,  Trans.  Am.  Phil.  Ass.,  XLV,  66. 


4  Studies  in  the  Psychology  or  Language 

ena  are  similar  in  the  case  of  speech  sounds.  They  will  be  more 
properly  treated  in  that  connection. 

The  splitting  up  of  a  part  of  the  speech  continuum  proceeds,  of 
course,  without  any  distinct  presence  of  past  imagery  of  a  similar 
sound  combination.  This  is  fused  with  the  sensation  and  does  not 
appear  separately,  at  least  not  in  the  act  of  hearing. 

Besides  the  word  as  a  sound  experience  we  have  also  its  function 
as  the  bearer  of  a  meaning.  This  meaning  is  determined  by  past 
responses  to  the  word,  which  have  been  of  a  varied  nature.  The 
particular  response  needed  here  is  selected  by  the  present  situation, 
i.e.,  the  part  of  the  sentence  already  elapsed  with  its  synthesized  atti- 
tude pointing  in  a  certain  direction.  The  partially  evolved  meaning 
of  a  part  of  a  sentence  determines  the  meaning  of  the  word,  and  this 
in  turn  modifies  the  direction  of  the  attitude.  Duerr,  in  speaking  of 
the  word,  calls  it  a  formula  to  be  filled  in  by  the  sentence. 

This  attitude  in  the  process  of  synthesis  during  the  listening  to  a 
sentence  is  of  an  active  type  which  is  always  ahead  of  the  modifying 
elements  of  the  moment.  In  a  general  way  the  contents  of  the  sen- 
tence is  vaguely  constructed  before  the  listener  has  heard  the  end. 
The  attitude  runs  along  the  well  known  schema  of  the  sentence  and 
produces  a  predisposition  (Einstellung)  for  each  word  or  phrase  to 
follow.  It  seems  to  happen  very  frequently  also  that  words  or  parts 
of  words  are  not  presented  as  actual  sensations,  but  are  supplied  from 
past  experience  entirely.  At  any  rate  the  auditory  sensation  does  not 
pass  through  the  center  of  consioucness  as  a  continual  sound  exper- 
ience of  constant  broadness,  but  it  supplies  only  a  number  of  'cues' 
that  are  woven  into  a  whole.  The  space  between  cues  may  then 
be  entirely  lacking  or  be  present  only  in  a  dim  way.  Again,  all  this 
is  implied  by  saying  that  our  attention  is  directed  towards  the  mean- 
ing. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances  the  word  functions  in  the  way  just 
described.  But  it  may  itself  also  become  the  object  of  attention. 
This  brings  it  outside  the  process  of  speech  and  makes  it  a  part  of 
the  physical  world. 

The  synthesis  of  the  attitude  which  finally  appears  as  the  meaning 
of  the  sentence  is  dependent  entirely  on  habits.  The  quick  succession 
of  the  words,  their  fleeting  character  as  perceptions,  would  hardly 
allow  them  to  function  as  they  do  if  they  were  not  parts  of  a  chain 
of  highly  mechanized  acts.     The  ability  to  think  stands  in  direct 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  5 

relation  to  the  amount  of  mechanized  language  processes  one  pos- 
sesses. 

Up  to  a  certain  point  the  problem  of  the  perception  of  speech  sounds 
is  similar  to  that  of  the  word.  Within  the  speech  continuum  which 
gives  rise  to  a  word  smaller  elements  are  again  split  off.  This  depends 
here  as  there  on  the  past  experience  in  which  a  sound  as  such  has  been 
a  unit  of  stimulation,  i.e.,  where  it  has  been  responded  to  as  such. 

Inasmuch  as  the  perception  of  a  speech  sound  depends  upon  the 
response   to   the  stimulation  it  is  not  surprising  to  find   that  the 
acoustic  phenomena  which  at  various  occasions  lead  to  the  perception 
of  the  'same'  sound  are  in  fact  never  quite  alike.   Let  us  go  back  one 
more  step  and  look  at  the  articulations  producing  the  sound  waves. 
They  belong  to  the  most  deeply  ingrained  habits  of  the  human  being. 
Not  only  have  we  the  habitual  movements  of  one  particular  set  of 
muscles  in  order  to  produce  a  certain  sound,  but  we  also  have  the 
correlation  of  the  action  of  several  muscular  systems,  such  as  those 
of  the  vocal  organs  proper  (lips,  jaws,  tongue,  velum,  larynx),  of  the 
chest,  and  of  a  large  region  of  the  trunk.   Furthermore  the  transition 
from  one  articulation  to  another  requires  some  special  movements,  as 
any  one  can  see  for  himself  if  he  tries  to  pronounce  a  sound  sequence 
that  does  not  occur  elsewhere  in  the  language  he  speaks.''  This  com- 
plicated mechanism  does  not  work  machine-like;  it  does  not  produce 
the  same  results  under  all  circumstances.  Habitual  movements  under 
similar  circumstances  attain  only  a  certain  degree  of  exactness.  They 
are  hardly  ever  identical  from  act  to  act.     In  a  certain  sense  the 
articulation  is  the  resonance  of  the  tonic  condition  of  the  body  and 
of  the  emotional  character  of  consciousness.     More  than  that,  the 
surrounding   articulations   leave    their    trace    or    show    their    effect 
before  they  are  actually  performed,  e.g.,  a  yfeis  articulated  at  different 
places  of  the  roof  of  the  mouth  accordingly  as  it  is  followed  by  an 
a,  e,  or  o.    Still  another  reason  for  variation  in  articulation  is  the 
difference  of  the  speech  apparatus  between  persons;  compare  only  the 
extreme  differences  between  a  child  and  an  adult,  a  man  and  a  woman. 

In  speaking  of  these  fluctuations  as  far  as  they  pertain  to  one  speak- 
ing individual  the  term  'zone  of  variations'  has  sometimes  been  used.^ 

*  Sievers,  E.,  Grimdzuge  der  Phonetik.^ 

*  Sievers,  E.,  op.  cit.,  272;  cp.  also  Passy,  P.  E.,  fyude surles changements phonitiques, 
40;  Paul,  H.,  Prinzipien  der  Sprachgeschichte,*  54;  Wundt,  W.,  Volker psychologic,^  I, 
387;  Oertel,  H.,  Lectures  on  the  Study  of  Language,  104. 


6  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

It  would  be  better,  it  seems  to  me,  to  extend  the  term  so  as  to  include 
also  the  articulations  of  individuals  of  the  same  community,  because 
it  is  not  any  objective  condition  of  the  physical  world  that  creates 
the  zone  of  variations,  but  a  psychic  activity  that  holds  together 
sounds  of  various  quahties  and  recognizes  them  as  'belonging  to  the 
same  type'  even  if  spoken  by  different  persons. 

The  social  situation  where  one  sentence  as  a  stimulus  calls  out 
another  sentence  as  response,  the  'expression  of  thinking,'  must  be 
supposed  to  exist  in  a  secondary  way  already  in  the  act  of  listening. 
That  is,  the  understanding  of  a  spoken  sentence  implies  already  an 
organized  set  of  responses.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  atten- 
tion is  turned  towards  the  attitude  which  will  finally  produce  the 
answer,  so  that  the  motor  responses  play  a  less  prominent  part  in 
consciousness.  These  do  not  stand  out  as  separate  processes,  but  are 
merged  in  the  synthetic  process  leading  up  to  the  Gesamtvorstellung. 
But  the  fact  that  they  are  not  analyzed  distinctly  in  the  stream  of 
consciousness  does  not  mean  that  they  are  not  present.  They  must  be 
present,  because  their  effect  is  felt  in  shaping  the  attitude  of  under- 
standing. Thus  the  analysis  of  the  field  of  stimulation  represented  by 
the  speech  continuum  into  words  and  sounds  does  not  exist  as  so  many 
separate  acts,  and  yet  it  is  there,  because  the  change  of  one  sound 
(Cp.  English  hat:  had;  hat:  hot)  or  the  addition  of  a  sound  like  the 
inflectional  5  changes  the  'meaning.'  This  reservation  must  not  be 
forgotten  in  a  discussion  of  this  kind,  lest  one  commit  the  well  known 
'stimulus  error.' 

A  certain  sound  experience  will  be  accepted  by  consiousness  as  the 
'same'  whether  that  sound  appears  in  different  words,  or  is  pronounced 
with  more  or  less  force,  or  in  a  higher  or  lower  pitch,  or  even  by  differ- 
ent persons,  although,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  it  will  objectively  be 
different  in  all  these  cases.  The  sound  a  as  in  father  is  the  'same' 
whether  pronounced  by  my  sister  or  brother,  whether  spoken  with  a 
loud  or  soft  voice,  in  joy  or  in  sadness.  The  'consciousness  of  same- 
ness' as  regards  such  a  sound  is  then  distinctly  a  psychic  creation 
in  which  certain  kinds  of  objective  differences  are  ignored.  In  terms 
of  behavior  we  have  an  identity  of  reaction  in  each  case.  If  we  were 
to  say  that  the  sound  is  recognized  as  'belonging  to  a  certain  type,' 
we  should  not  state  the  facts  quite  accurately.  For  it  is  primarily 
not  the  past  experience  present  in  some  typified  imagery  that  creates 
the    'consciousness   of   sameness,'    but    the   response   itself,    or    the 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  7 

attitude  of  response,  depending  on  the  function  of  the  sound.  Wher- 
ever slightly  different  phonetic  elements  have  a  functional  identity 
there  is  the  tendency  to  produce  identical  responses.  If  we  turn 
back  again  in  introspection  upon  such  experience,  we  find  a  'con- 
sciousness of  sameness,'  which  does  not  necessarily  have  to  be  pre- 
sent at  the  time  of  the  original  hearing  as  a  clearly  distinct  process. 

It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  out  of  the  great  variety  of  speech  sounds 
which  are  possible  and  are  observed  to  exist  in  one  language  or  an- 
other, only  a  limited  number  are  employed  in  any  one  language. 
What  is  a  common  sound  in  one  language  may  be  wholly  lacking  in 
another.  Furthermore,  the  number  of  distinct  sounds  recognized 
in  a  given  language  by  accurate  phonetic  analysis  is  greater  than  the 
number  distinguished  by  the  discrimination  of  the  phonetically 
untrained  speaker,  whether  literate  (in  which  case  he  may  be  strongly 
biased  by  the  visual  image  of  the  written  form)  or  illiterate. 

This  selective  simplicity  of  the  phonetic  system  of  a  language 
is  also  in  accord  with  two  general  considerations. 

On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  general  reason  for  the  creation  of 
types  in  our  conscious  processes.  In  terms  of  conduct  the  type  is  a 
stimulation  which  leads  to  uniform  responses.  A  number  of  physical 
objects  are  all  tables  to  us  on  account  of  the  similar  response  or 
attitude  to  sit  down  before  them  or  to  put  things  upon  them.  This 
'type,'  or  unified  response,  is  alone  active  in  consciousness  if  I  hear 
of  'a  table.'  The  type  plus  some  specific  response  will  be  called  out 
by  'the  table.'  In  the  first  case  individual  traits  are  of  no  account, 
i.e.,  they  have  no  meaning,  they  are  not  needed.  Thus  it  is  with  the 
consciousness  of  sameness  of  speech  sounds.  All  that  is  needed  is  a 
number  of  unified  responses  or  attitudes  which  go  to  make  up  the 
perception  of  the  word  and  finally  of  the  sentence.  A  word  will 
therefore  be  the  'same'  where  and  however  it  occurs,  and  the  sounds 
that  compose  it  will  be  the  'same'  in  other  words. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  an  historical  reason  for  the  assumption 
of  the  simplicity  of  phonetic  systems,  namely,  the  fact  of  sound 
change.  We  know  definitely  that  a  sound  change  often  comprises 
the  entire  zone  of  variations,  that  the  whole  zone  changes  in  a  certain 
direction,  and  that  the  individual  sounds  do  not  all  fall  a  prey  to  the 
surrounding  influences  of  other  sounds,  but  follow  one  direction. 
And  wherever  a  special  condition  is  strong  enough  to  cause  a  split 
in  the  zone  of  variations,  the  new  sound  usually  falls  together  with 
one  represented  by  another  zone. 


8  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

From  the  point  of  view  of  an  associational  psychology  it  is  the 
association  of  slightly  different  sounds  that  holds  together  the  zone 
of  variations,  so  that  the  individual  sounds  do  not  fall  out  of  line 
through  assimulating  influences.  Wundt  says:  ^^Wirken  die  Laut- 
kontakte  differenzierend,  .  ...  so  wirken  umgekehrt  die  Lautassozia- 
tionen  uniformierend,  indem  sie  solchen  Lautgruppen  und  Einzel- 
lauten,  die  durch  hdufigen  Gebrauch  in  hoherem  Mass  eingeiibt  sind, 
mehr  und  mehr  das  Ubergewicht  verschaffen  iiber  andere,  seltenere.''^ 
The  criticism  as  regards  such  a  view  is  a  general  one:  The  principle 
of  association  does  not  explain  the  process  as  yet;  the  principle 
itself  must  be  accounted  for.'' 

There  is  another  fact  which  shows  that  the  sound  possesses  some 
independence:  The  possibility  of  such  'mistakes'  which  in  philology 
are  called  metathesis,  dissimilation,  and  distant  assimilation  of 
sounds.  Compare  Old  English  waxan  from  wascan,  Latin  celebrum 
for  cerebrum,  cocodrillus  for  crocodillus,  Italian  grolioso  for  glorioso. 

In  contrast  to  the  consciousness  of  sameness  just  described,  there 
also  exists  a  consciousness  of  difference  of  speech  sounds.  We  hear 
the  'same'  sound  to  be  sure  under  different  conditions,  but  we  are 
also  aware  of  its  being  different,  or  at  least  of  its  different  import. 
Referring  to  the  instance  given  above,  we  are  aware  by  whom  the 
sound  a  in  a  given  word  is  pronounced  and  also  in  what  mood  it  is 
uttered.  Actual  variations  as  regards  pitch,  force,  and  quantity 
may  be  partly  analyzed  as  such  in  the  field  of  stimulation,  although 
usually  they  are  not,  but  variations  in  quality  very  rarely  appear  as 
separable  or  distinguishable  experiences.  Looked  at  from  the  view- 
point of  import,  those  variations  that  play  a  part  in  forming  the 
understanding  of  the  sentence  are  the  ones  that  can  be  separated 
in  the  field  of  stimulation.  They  are  those  characteristics  which 
represent  the  dynamic  and  chromatic  accent.  But  the  differences 
which  impart  the  mood  of  the  speaker,  his  tonic  bodily  condition,  his 
personality  itself,  can  as  a  rule  not  be  analysed,  There  is  danger 
then  of  taking  the  term  'consciousness  of  difference'  just  as  the  term 
'consciousness  of  sameness,'  too  literally,  and  against  this  we  must 
guard.  Just  as  we  found  that  in  terms  of  conduct  the  perception  of 
similar  sounds  really  means  a  functional  identity  and  consequently 
a  similar  response,  so  the  difference  in  the  perception  of  similar 

*  Wundt,  W.,  op.  cit.,  532;  cp.  Karsten,  G.,  Phonetische  Studien,  III,  8. 
">  Mead,  G.  H.,  Psych.  Bull,  I,  380. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  9 

sounds  means  in  fact  a  functional  difference  and  consequently  a 
difference  in  response.  Two  persons  may  pronounce  a  sound  or  a 
sound  combination,  a  word,  in  precisely  the  same  manner,  so  that 
they  are  seemingly  'the  same'  in  both  experiences  of  the  hearer,  and 
yet  each  single  experience  also  contains  the  reference  to  the  speaker. 
I  can  tell  without  analysis  or  reflection  who  it  is  that  speaks  in  the 
next  room,  my  brother  or  my  sister.  Besides  the  various  attitudes 
called  out  by  the  stimulation  of  the  utterance  as  already  indicated 
there  is  also  present  an  attitude  directed  towards  the  speaker  implying 
his  personality.  Such  an  attitude  can  attain  any  degree  of  intensity, 
from  the  actual  perception  of  the  speaker  as  a  self  to  the  very  dim 
awareness  of  his  presence.  Similarly  it  is  with  the  other  imports 
of  the  consciousness  of  difference.  Objectively  considered,  the 
variations  caused  by  the  varying  emotional  states  of  the  speaker's 
consciousness  may  exist,  but  it  depends  on  our  response  whether 
and  to  what  degree  we  shall  be  aware  of  them. 

II 

The  existence  of  a  unified  response  to  a  particular  group  of  similar 
speech  sounds  for  which  I  have  used  the  term  'consciousness  of  same- 
ness, is  of  considerable  importance  in  regard  to  the  problem  of  uniform 
sound  change.* 

This  dogma  of  uniform  change  is  now  about  40  years  old.  Long 
before  the  seventies  of  the  last  centruy  the  fact  of  great  regularity 
in  many  sound  changes  had  been  recognized.  Thus  Grimm  had  found 
that  Indo-European  surd  stops  are  replaced  in  Germanic  languages 
by  spirants  (compare  Latin  pater:  English /a^/fer,  Latin  tres:  English 
three,  Latin  cornii:  English  horn),  and  many  other  sweeping  changes 
had  been  recognized  and  tabulated.  More  and  more  "phonetic  laws  ' 
were  discovered.  But  even  those  scholors  who  emphasized  most 
forcibly  the  importance  of  such  laws  did  not  hesitate  to  assume  casual 
exceptions;  and  it  was  not  until  1876  that  Leskien  stated  that 
"language  is  not  a  fit  subject  for  scientific  investigation"  if  we 
allowed  the  "exceptions"  to  stand  beside  the  "regularity  of  sound 
laws."  If  we  find  that  a  sound  change  is  not  what  it  ought  to  be 
according  to  the  "sound  law"  then  we  must  account  for  its  occurrence 

^  For  a  history  of  the  dogma  see  Wechssler,  E.,  debt  es  Lautgesetze? ,  77  ff.  with 
full  bibliography;  also  Oertel,  H.,  op.  cit.,  258. 


10  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

instead  of  regarding  it  as  a  matter  of  chance.^  The  following  ten 
years  saw  one  of  the  most  violent  battles  ever  fought  in  any  science. 
The  philologists  were  separated  into  two  clearly  distinct  camps. 
Along  with  Leskien,  the  "Junggrammatiker,"  among  whom  were 
Brugmann,  Osthoff,  Paul,  Delbrueck,  and  Sievers,  defended  the  dogma 
that  in  a  given  dialect  and  period  all  phonetic  laws  work  without 
exceptions,  unless  they  are  counteracted  by  other  forces  such  as 
analogy.  Against  these  stood  another  group  of  eminent  linguists, 
among  whom  were  Curtius,  Whitney,  Easton,  Schuchardt,  Bezzen- 
berger,  Collitz,  Tobler,  and  Jespersen,  who  maintained  that  an  abso- 
lute uniformity  was  inconceivable,  because  speech  as  a  psychical 
process  could  not  be  expected  to  be  subject  to  laws  similar  to  those 
of  the  physical  world,  since  the  conditions  were  all  too  varied  and 
unanalyzable. 

Present  linguistic  science  recognizes  a  measure  of  truth  and  value 
in  both  positions  and  tends  towards  less  dogmatism  in  theory  but 
greater  strictness  in  practice.  On  the  one  hand  the  uncompromising 
assertion  of  uniformity  served  to  discredit  the  loose  assumption  of 
casual  exceptions,  and  led  in  countless  specific  cases  to  a  satisfactory 
explanation  of  apparent  exceptions.  Futhermore,  it  is  universally 
admitted  that  a  great  proportion  of  phonetic  changes  exhibit  uni- 
formity under  like  conditions  which  are  capable  of  formulation;  that 
is,  not  merely  under  absolutely  identical  conditions  the  insistence 
in  which  would  make  any  formulation  impractical,  but  under  ap- 
proximately like  conditions  in  which  minor  differences  may  be  ignored 
like  the  remoter  decimals  in  a  mathematical  calculation.  Again  the 
principle  of  causality  finally  led  to  attempts  not  only  to  account  for 
the  'exceptions,'  but  also  for  the  'laws'  themselves.  On  the  other 
hand  the  insistence  on  the  fact  that  variations  do  exist  in  great  num- 
bers as  shown  in  our  everyday  speech,  has  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
linguist  to  the  complexity  of  conditions  that  accompany  sound 
production  and  sound  change.  Besides  the  relatively  simple  factors 
which  the  supporters  of  the  dogma  had  in  mind  at  first  as  determining 
like  and  unlike  conditions  (surrounding  sounds,  accent,  etc.)  there 
are  many  others  which,  while  often  practically  negligible,  must  also 
be  reckoned  with.  It  has  also  paved  the  way  for  a  clear  distinction 
between  variations  of  sounds  in  any  direction  due  to  momentary 

*  Leskien,  A.,  Die  Deklination  im  Slavisch-Lilauischen  und  Germanischen,  p.  xxviii. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  11 

conditions,  as  emotional  or  bodily  states,  and  changes  of  sounds 
arising  out  of  persistent  variations  in  one  direction  due  to  phonetic 
tendencies. 

As  a  result  of  adverse  criticism  we  now  find  such  carefully  worded 
statements  as  that  of  Paul :  ''Wenn  wir  daher  von  konsequenter  Wirkung 
der  Lautgesetze  reden,  so  kann  das  nur  heissen,  dass  bei  dem  Laut- 
wandel  inner  halt  desselbe^i  Dialektes  alle  einzelnen  Fdlle,  in  denen  die 
gleichen    lautlichen    Bedingungen    vorliegen,    gleichmdssig    behandelt 

werden Man  muss  dabei  natiirlich  sdmtliche  Momente  der  Laut- 

erzeugung  inhetracht  Ziehen.  Namentlich  muss  man  auch  das  Wort 
nickt  isoliert,  sondern  nach  seiner  Stellung  innerhalb  des  Satzgefuges 
betrachten.  Erst  dann  ist  es  moglich  die  Konsequenz  der  Lautgesetze  zu 
erkennen.^'^^  In  theory  there  seems  to  be  no  objection  to  such  a 
principle,  but  the  study  of  any  living  dialect  shows  that  there  are 
very  few  cases  of  'like  conditions.'  A  careful  observer  like  Weigand 
for  instance  denies  them  entirely.^^  The  lack  of  uniformity  in  a  given 
dialect  has  also  been  shown  by  Gauchat^^  who  has  given  us  the  most 
interesting  dialect  study  we  have  and  whose  results  are  in  striking 
contrast  to  those  of  Rousselot.^^  And  even  if  we  should  agree  with 
Paul's  assertion  (arrived  at  by  a  logical  process  carried  too  far)  that 
"we  must  distinguish  as  many  languages  as  there  are  individuals"^* 
there  would  still  be  the  different  social  situations  which  cause  the 
individual  to  speak  differently  at  times  as  well  as  his  own  changing 
bodily  and  mental  states.  Our  'consciousness  of  difference'  is  a 
sufficient  indication  of  ever  changing  conditions  in  speaking. 

Imitation  has  been  recognized  as  the  most  potent  factor  that  works 
towards  uniformity  in  the  group  though  one  particular  type  of 
imitation  may  disturb  uniformity.  Its  mechansim  will  be  analyzed 
in  the  second  of  these  studies.  That  consciousness  of  sameness 
functions  in  a  similar  way  in  regard  to  the  speech  of  one  individual 
will  be  shown  in  the  following  pages.   From  the  point  of  view  of  con- 

"  Paul,  H.,  op.  cit.,  69. 

"  Weigand,  G.,  Linguistischer  Atlas  des  dako-rumanischen  Sprachgebietes,  19. 
^^  Gauchat,  L.,  L'unite  phonetique  dans  la  patois  d'une  commune  in  Festschrift  fiir 
Morf,  175. 

*^  Rousselot,  J.,  Les  modifications  phonetiqites  du  langage — etudiees  dans  la  patois 
d'une  famille  de  Cellefrouin.    Ret.  des  patois  Gallo-Rom.,  IV,  65;  V,  412  ff. 
"  Paul,  H.,  op.  cit.,  37. 


12  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

duct  both  processes  are  somewhat  alike  in  so  far  as  they  rest  upon 
identity  of  responses. 

Ill 
In  order  to  prove  the  possibihty  of  uniform  change  of  a  sound  in 
all  words  of  the  language  of  an  individual,  Brugmann  and  Paul 
argue  that  it  must  be  the  motor  image  of  a  single  sound  that  changes 
and  not  that  of  a  word:  ^^Das  Bewegungsgefiihl  bildet  sich  ja  nicht 
fiir  jedes  einzelne  Wort  besonders,  sondern  iiberall,  wo  in  der  Rede  die 
gleichen  Elemente  wiederkehren,  wird  ihre  Erzeugung  durch  das  gleiche 
Bewegungsgefiihl  geregeli."^^  This  opinion  is  supported  by  the  fact 
that  whenever  a  child  is  able  to  pronounce  a  new  sound  it  will  use 
it  in  all  the  words  where  its  own  small  community  uses  it.  Meringer 
ventures  a  flat  contradiction:  "Ich  halte  das  einfach  fur  falsch.  Die 
Aussprache  wird  in  der  Tat  fiir  jedes  einzelne  Wort  besonders  gelernt, 
was  man  gleich  sehen  wird,  wenn  man  beobachtet,  wie  vorsichtig  tastend 
wir  oft  ungewohnliche  Worter  sprechen.  Diese  werden  wirklich  buch- 
stabierend  hervorgebracht,  aber  geldufiges  Reden  ware  wohl  ohne  die 
Worts prechbilder  unmoglich."'^^  This  argument  refers  only  to  such 
'unusual  words'  which  contain  unfamiliar  sound  combinations. 
It  overlooks  the  fact  that  not  only  the  articulation  of  a  sound  is 
based  on  habits,  but  also  its  joining  to  the  preceding  and  following 
sounds.  We  can  pronounce  without  difficulty  or  hesitation  new  words, 
e.g.,  proper  names,  as  long  as  they  contain  besides  famihar  sounds 
also  familiar  sound  sequences.  It  is  for  the  absence  of  these  latter 
that  foreign  names  are  often  difficult  and  that  we  proceed  hesitatingly 
in  trying  to  pronounce  them. 

A  necessary  sequence  to  the  theory  that  the  word  changes  as  a  unit 
would  be  that  a  sound  change  must  be  transferred  from  one  word  to 
another  in  order  to  become  uniform.  This  is  Weigand's  position  who 
bases  his  statement  "Die  Lautverdnderungen  gehen  von  einzelnen 
Wdrtern  aus^''  upon  a  multitude  of  observations  in  modern  Roumanian 
dialects.  Gauchat^*  observes  the  change  of  a  certain  sound  in  some 
words  and  not  in  others  in  the  case  of  the  same  individual,  and  in 
more  words  in  the  speech  of  some  individuals  (usually  the  younger) 

« Ibid.,  69. 

"  Meringer,  R.,  und  Mayer,  K.,  Versprechen  und  Verlesen,  7;  cp.  Wechssler,  E., 
op.  cit.,  22. 

17  Weigand,  G.,  op.  cit.,  37. 
"  Gauchat,  L.,  op.  cit.,  205. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  13 

than  in  others.  TarbelP^  and  Whitney^"  cite  the  New  England 
shortening  of  the  long  o  in  whole,  stone,  etc.,  which  occurs  only  in 
certain  words,  varying  in  different  communities.  Wheeler  referring 
to  this  change-^  expresses  the  opinion  that  all  "ultimate  uniformity" 
is  brought  about  in  this  way.  According  to  him  the  difference  be- 
tween a  new  and  an  old  pronunciation  of  one  sound  in  one  word  is 
carried  over  to  the  same  sound  in  other  words;  this  is  "the  compelling 
force".!  confess  I  cannot  see  a  "compelling  force"  in  the  mere  difference 
between  two  pronunciations  even  if  one  were  felt  as  new  and  the  other 
as  old.  There  may  be  an  uncertainty  in  regard  to  the  choice  of  either 
pronunciation,  but  then  an  additional  cause  would  be  needed  to  fix 
one  or  the  other  of  the  alternatives. 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  issue  of  sound  or  word  change  is  not  a 
real  one.  Judging  from  different  sets  of  facts  each  side  is  correct  in 
part,  but  neither  could  prove  its  point  entirely.  For  it  is  not  at  all 
a  question  of  either-or,  whether  we  speak  on  the  basis  of  motor 
images  of  sounds  or  of  words.  The  fact  is,  we  have  and  use  both. 
Furthermore,  the  articulation  of  a  single  sound  consists  in  the  co- 
ordination of  a  number  of  muscular  systems.  If  Paul's  reasoning 
is  correct,  it  ought  to  apply  to  the  elements  of  such  a  coordination 
as  well,  which  indeed  it  seems  to  do  when  we  find  that  in  a  language 
all  voiced  stops  irrespective  of  their  place  of  articulation  are  shifted 
to  voiceless  stops.  The  function  of  a  motor  image  of  a  sound  is  not  so 
very  different  from  that  of  a  word.  Both  contain  highly  complex 
coordinations,  the  word  more  so  than  the  sound,  so  that  we  may 
regard  both  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  execution  of  habitual 
movements  as  similar  actions,  but  of  a  different  order. 

Opinions  of  this  kind  are  sometimes  coupled  with  a  rather  too- 
mechanical  interpretation  of  the  relation  of  habitual  movements, 
to  their  corresponding  images.  It  is  no  doubt  correctly  supposed  that 
a  certain  neural  disposition,  a  diathesis  as  Oertal  calls  it,"  lies  at 
the  bottom  of  such  a  movement  and  it  is  further  implied  that  a  stim- 
ulation of  the  diathesis  always  creates  the  same  movement  as  a 
mould  can  impress  but  one  form.  A  movement  as  well  as  a  sensation 
is  modified  by  past  imagery  and  the  present  'situation.'     For  this 

"  Tarbell,  F.  B.,  Trans.  Am.  Phil.  Assoc,  1886,  p.  5. 
"  Whitney,  W.  D.,  Indogerm.  Forsch.,  IV,  32. 
"  Wheeler,  B.  J.,  Trans.  Am.  Phil.  Assoc,  1901,  14. 
^  Oertel,  H.,  op.  ciL,  102. 


14  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

reason  it  is  ever  varying.  Furthermore  it  exhibits  a  constant  variation 
according  to  specific  surrounding  movements,  as  is  the  case  in 
sound  articulations  of  a  fixed  sequence.  How  it  is  that  in  spite  of 
these  modifying  influences  similar  sounds  are  kept  together  so  to 
speak  to  develop  all  along  a  definite  line  or  to  remain  stationary 
will  be  shown  in  the  following  pages  as  being  due  to  the  consciousness 
of  sameness  (or  functional  identity)  of  speech  sounds. 

For  our  purposes  all  gradual  phonetic  changes  may  be  grouped 
into  three  classes: 

First,  we  have  the  case  of  a  uniform  sound  shift  that  affects  a 
certain  sound  in  all  words  and  under  nearly  all  conditions  as  for 
instance  the  shift  of  Indo-European  p  to  Germanic/.  These  we  may 
call  generic  changes.  Cases  of  uniform  shifts  under  all  possible  con- 
ditions are  extremely  rare. 

Secondly,  a  sound  under  special  conditions  may  be  diverted  from 
the  type  to  which  it  belongs,  a  process  which  we  may  call  a  singular 
change.  If  this  type  happens  to  be  changing,  the  sound  may  show  either 
a  retardation  or  an  acceleration  of  the  change  in  a  number  of  words 
where  a  special  condition  exists,  as  the  Indo-European  p  remained 
a  />  if  a  spirant  preceded,  or  it  was  shifted  not  only  to  /,  but  also  to 
V  if  it  happened  to  be  the  the  final  of  an  unaccented  syllable.  If  the 
type  happens  to  be  stationary,  the  diversion  from  type  can  of  course 
happen  in  only  one  way,  namely,  that  a  sound  is  changed  under  a 
special  condition  while  similar  sounds  under  other  conditions  remain. 
These  two  classes  of  changes  have  usually  been  called  'spontaneous' 
and  'conditioned,'  terms  which  reflect  the  argumentation  as  regards 
the  invariability  of  phonetic  laws.  Generally  one  of  the  'conditions' 
of  a  change  of  the  second  class  was  easily  recognized,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  stationary  sp  the  preceding  spirant,  but  did  this  mean  that 
a  change  of  the  first  class,  as  that  of  p  to  /,  was  unconditioned? 
Delbriick  remarks  truly:  "Es  ist  anzunehmen,  dass  bei  fortschreitender 
Erkenntnis  sich  fiir  uns  das  Gehiet  des  bedingten  Lautwandels  gegeniiber 
dem  unbedingten  immer  mehr  erweitern  wird."^^ 

Thirdly,  a  sound  may  change  only  in  one  word  or  in  a  number  of 
words  of  a  particular  class  and  remain  stationary  elsewhere  even 
where  similar  phonetic  conditions  seem  to  exist.  This  has  often  been 
termed  a  sporadic  change,  though  at  one  time  owing  to  the  too  free 

^  Delbriick,  B.,  Einleitung  in  das  Studiutn  der  indogermanischen  Sprachen,  150. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  15 

assumption  of  "sporadic  changes"  the  term  fell  into  discredit.  Most 
(not  all)  examples  of  metathesis,  distance  association  and  dissociation 
are  of  this  character,  likewise  changes  in  words  of  special  use,  as  in 
greetings  or  auxiliaries. 

I  have  stated  before  that  the  historical  material  which  gives  us 
numerous  cases  of  changes,  namely  generic  changes  of  sounds  or 
rather  zones  of  variations  under  nearly  all  conditions,  is  one  of  the 
reasons  for  the  assumption  of  a  consciousness  of  sameness.  It  now 
remains  to  show  the  way  in  which  this  consciousness  of  sameness 
must  be  supposed  to  function  in  regard  to  phonetic  change. 

What  is  presented  in  consciousness  as  a  single  sound  includes  in 
fact  a  number  of  different  phonetic  elements.  A  sound  then  repre- 
sents a  zone  and  not  a  point,  a  sound  change  a  band  and  not  a  line. 
Generally  speaking  the  usually  unanalyzed  differences  giving  rise 
to  responses  termed  the  'consciousness  of  difference,'  (see  above,  p.  8) 
do  not  take  part  in  a  change;  they  are  contained  alike  in  the  two  zones 
at  the  beginning  and  end  of  a  change,  where  beginning  and  end  very 
often  mean  in  a  continuous  process  of  shifting  only  two  stages  which 
happened  to  become  reflected  in  the  written  documents  of  the  periods. 
It  is  exactly  that  group  of  variations  in  quality  which  is  of  'no  account' 
and  is  therefore  responded  to  by  a  unified  reaction  that  takes  part 
in  the  shift.  At  the  same  time  the  identity  of  function  remains  stable; 
we  must  suppose  it  to  be  at  the  final  stage  of  the  shift  what  it  was  at 
the  initial,  for  the  same  sound  occupies  in  both  instances  the  same 
positions  in  the  different  words.  (Cp.  English'/Mn' :  German  'Jiinn'; 
English  'fa/Aom':  German  'Fac?en.')  In  other  words,  the  consciousness 
of  sameness  is  stationary  while  its  actual  content  is  being  shifted. 

This  fact  is  referred  to  by  linguists  when  they  state  that  gradual 
phonetic  change  goes  on  'unnoticed'  by  the  speakers.  The  explanation 
of  this  phenomenon  is  supposed  to  lie  in  the  direction  of  attention. 
This  is  not  entirely  correct,  if  attention  be  taken  with  its  usual  conno- 
tation, for  I  can  Hsten  intently  to  every  sound  of  the  speaker  and  yet 
fail  to  notice  any  differences.  It  is  the  direction  of  the  response  called 
out  by  the  speech  sounds  that  creates  the  consciousness  of  sameness. 
The  listener  is  not  concerned  with  the  speech  sounds  as  physical 
phenomena  or  objects,  but  about  their  meaning,  the  attitude  which 
the  utterance  of  the  speaker  is  about  to  create.  Attention  must  be 
identified  with  the  direction  of  the  response;  the  analogy  of  the  field 


16  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

and  its  focus  is  misleading,  or  at  least,  while  appropriate  for  'content' 
of  consciousness,  it  is  insufl6cient  in  regard  to  its  processes. 

The  zone  of  variations  of  a  speech  sound,  as  far  as  only  its  quality 
is  concerned,  is  the  result  of  two  groups  of  influences,  the  momentary 
conditions  such  as  emotional  and  physical  states,  and  the  phonetic 
tendencies.  Of  these  there  are  in  the  first  place  those  particular  ten- 
dencies which  are  characteristic  of  a  language  and  which  produce 
generic  changes.  In  the  second  place  there  are  the  universal  tendencies 
whose  effects  can  be  seen  in  many  widely  scattered  languages,  and 
they  tend  to  produce  those  singular  changes  in  a  limited  number 
of  words,  of  which  the  assimilations  are  the  most  characteristic 
ones. 

Usually  one  is  satisfied  to  'explain'  an  assimilation  by  referring 
to  the  special  condition  which  existed  in  the  word  before  the  change 
had  taken  place.  Perhaps  it  is  not  the  duty  of  philology  to  go  further. 
But  a  linguistic  psychology  must  ask  the  question:  Why  does  a 
certain  assimilation  occur  in  one  language  and  not  in  another,  al- 
though apparently  the  same  phonetic  conditions  exist  in  both?  For 
instance,  the  sequence  pt  becomes  in  the  Western  Romance  languages 
U  (Latin  septem  becomes  in  Italian  sette,  Spanish  siette,  Old  French  set) 
while  it  remains  pt  in  the  Eastern  languages  (Roumanian  sapte).  It 
generally  remains  unchanged  in  the  Germanic  languages  (Cp.  English 
kept,  German  schnappte)  except  in  isolated  cases  (The  German 
auxiliary  hatte  from  Old  High  German  hapta). 

The  fact  is  that  not  all  the  universal  singular  tendencies,  although 
existing  in  most  languages,  are  able  to  divert  the  specially  condi- 
tioned sounds  from  their  type  or  from  the  direction  of  the  particular 
dialectic  shift,  but  that  the  generic  tendencies  are  stronger  so  to 
speak  than  the  singular  tendencies.  Otherwise  the  historical  material 
would  present  a  picture  of  similar  changes  in  all  dialects  wherein 
those  corresponding  to  the  generic  changes  would  appear  as  'except- 
tions.'  As  it  is,  the  generic  changes  are  the  most  easily  recognizable 
traits  of  dialectic  developments  with  the  singular  changes  appearing 
as  exceptions  to  such  a  degree  that  they  have  been  and  still  are  some- 
times so  called.  The  question  asked  above  should  from  this  point 
of  view  be  formulated  thus:  Why  does  a  generic  change  affect  a 
sound  under  all  or  most  conditions;  why  are  so  few  stragglers  left  on 
the  road  or  others  to  take  a  different  path?  What  is  the  process  by 
which  the  zone  of  variations,  as  regards  quality,  is  kept  within  certain 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  17 

limits;  why  is  it  not  more  frequently  split  up  into  several  zones,  as 
indeed  we  ought  to  expect  it  on  the  basis  of  the  many  existing  singular 
tendencies? 

Consciousness  of  sameness  implies  in  a  negative  way  the  absence 
of  awareness  of  any  differences.  It  is  sometimes  quite  remarkable 
how  sounds  are  perceived  as  the  same  which  are  in  fact  widely  apart. 
This  appears  especially  in  adapting  one's  self  to  a  foreign  language. 
A  German  learning  English  will  almost  invariably  use  the  same 
initial  combination  /  plus  sh  in  'germ'  as  well  as  in  'chamber'.  In  his 
language  only  this  combination  exists;  he  does  therefore  neither 
'hear'  the  g  (d  plus  z  as  in  'azure'),  nor  is  he  able  to  pronounce  it 
until  he  is  made  to  distinguish  between  the  voiced  and  voiceless 
character  of  the  two,  i.e.,  until  his  field  of  stimulation  is  analyzed  to 
a  greater  degree. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  may  very  well  be  that  the  generic 
and  the  singular  tendencies,  which  I  suppose  to  be  active  during  the 
adult  life  of  the  individual,  actually  cause  a  broadening  of  the  zone 
of  variations  in  regard  to  quality.  The  results  of  the  universal 
singular  tendencies  which  work  under  special  conditions  in  a  limited 
number  of  words  may  actually  be  productive  without  the  speaker's 
noticing  it.  Sounds  affected  in  this  way  still  belong  to  the  zone  of 
variations  with  which  he  once  started  his  life's  career  as  a  speaking 
being.  The  identity  of  function  for  these  sounds  remains  the  same 
in  his  speech  and  consequently  the  consciousness  of  sameness  in 
regard  to  them. 

For  instance,  if  a  generic  tendency  shifts  the  vowel  e  (as  in  'bet') 
towards  a  closer  pronunciation  in  the  direction  of  i  (as  in  'bit'), 
it  may  well  happen  that  a  singular  tendency  works  towards  retaining 
the  e  before  an  r  on  account  of  the  hollow  shape  which  the  tongue 
assumes  in  articulating  this  consonant.  This  actually  happened  in 
Gothic,  where  the  e  was  generally  shifted  to  i  (cp.  Gothic  hilpan: 
help),  while  it  remained  an  e  before  r  (and  Ji).  At  the  beginning  of 
this  shift  we  may  assume  that  two  qualitites  of  e,  one  closer  than 
the  other,  existed  side  by  side  unnoticed  by  the  speakers. 

The  only  possible  way  it  seems  to  me  where  the  consciousness 
of  sameness  for  a  group  of  sounds  might  thus  be  broken  up  is  in  the 
learning  process,  but  this  may  also  cause  a  giving  up  of  differentia- 
tions and  consequently  cause  a  narrowing  of  the  zone  of  variations. 


18  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

It  is  a  well  observed  fact  that  children  do  not  learn  all  the  sounds 
of  their  mother  tongue  at  once.  Before  they  have  attained  complete 
mastery  in  speaking  they  substitute  for  an  unacquired  sound  the 
one  from  among  the  acquired  sounds  which  is  nearest  to  it  in  acoustic 
effect  or  place  of  articulation.  Thus  for  /  and  th  they  may  use  only 
/";  or  instead  of  t  and  k  they  may  use  only  t  {free  for  three;  tome  for 
come).  As  the  process  of  adaptation  is  going  on,  thechild  will  substitute 
each  new  sound  as  soon  as  it  has  learned  it  wherever  it  belongs,  i.e., 
wherever  its  function  demands  it  according  to  the  language  of  the 
environment.  A  functional  identity  of  /  is  thus  eventually  broken 
up  into  two; /  and  th. 

As  soon  as  a  new  member  is  added  to  the  sound  system  of  the 
learner,  a  number  of  unfamiliar  sequences  are  created  which  have  to 
be  mastered  as  well  as  the  new  sounds.  This  is  a  stage  where  the  singular 
tendencies  produce  their  quickest  results.  Child  language  abounds 
in  assimilations.  They  seldom  become  strongly  fixed  by  habits,  but 
appear  rather  sporadically.  It  is  only  in  words  of  a  special  use  that 
they  may  be  retained.  In  most  words,  usually  in  all,  the  assimilations 
are  by  and  by  replaced  by  well  mastered  sound  sequences,  since  the 
identity  of  function  insists  on  the  putting  in  place  of  the  new  sound, 
according  to  the  model  of  the  speech  of  the  group. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  such  sequences  are  'new'  in  the  sense 
that  they  have  been  acquired  through  a  mechanical  process  by  the 
child  himself  and  need  not  represent  the  variations  of  adult  speech 
produced  by  the  singular  tendencies  after  the  learning  process  had 
been  finished.  It  seems  possible  then  that  singular  changes  occur  in  a 
minute  way  constantly  in  the  speech  of  adult  individuals  without 
leading  anywhere,  because  they  are  lost  with  them,  while  their 
children  start  on  a  fresh  course;  in  such  a  way  the  zone  of  variations 
of  a  speech  sound  is  narrowed  by  every  new  generation,  because  the 
articulation  of  a  new  speech  sound  is  introduced  into  the  phonetic 
material  already  existing  as  a  type  movement  fresh  from  the  mould,  so 
to  speak,  in  every  instance  and  is  joined  to  the  neighboring  sounds 
by  movements  that  arise  in  a  mechanical  way. 

It  is  to  be  supposed  that  the  subsequent  development  of  the  child's 
language  may  arrive  at  two  different  ends.  On  the  one  hand,  his 
number  of  speech  sounds,  i.e.,  zones  of  variations,  may  coincide 
with  that  of  the  speech  community  of  the  adults  about  him  and  may 
remain  so.     This  means  that  the  child  has  definitely  accepted  the 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 


19 


phonetic  material  as  handed  down  to  him  at  the  stage  to  which  the 
tendencies  had  shifted  it  without  allowing  for  the  beginning  of  a  new 
movement  in  the  direction  of  a  singular  change  (Diagram  I,  column  2). 
This  must  be  the  more  universal  case,  since  otherwise  we  should 
experience  singular  changes  more  frequently. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  the  zones  of  variations  which 
his  consciousness  of  sameness  distinguishes  may  not  coincide  with 
that  of  his  environment.  That  is,  either  two  zones  may  have  fallen 
together,  which,  although  closely  touching  each  other,  must  still 
have  been  separate  in  the  speech  of  the  older  generations.  (Note: 
Cp.  the  falling  together  of  the  Indo-European  hh  and  the  specially 
conditioned  p  at  the  end  of  an  unaccented  syllable  in  Germanic  v) 
Or  a  zone  of  variations  may  be  broken  up  in  two  so  that  a  sound  is 
diverted  from  the  type  to  which  it  belonged  and  may  now  move  into  a 
direction  prescribed  by  special  conditions.  In  such  a  case  the  ob- 
jectively noticeable  differences  may  be  about  the  same  in  the  speech 
of  the  adult  as  in  that  of  the  child,  but  where  there  is  one  zone  of 
variations  as  regards  the  consciousness  of  sameness  in  the  one,  there 
are  two  zones  in  the  other  (Diagram  I,  column  4). 

For  instance,  a  mother  may  pronounce  the  sound  a  with  slight 
variations  according  to  what  other  sound  follows.  In  the  diagram 
the  small  index  figures  are  to  indicate  such  variations.  The  child 
may  learn  for  all  the  different  a's  just  one  sound  a.  But  it  will  soon 
also  develop  the  variations,  because  the  singular  tendencies  remain 
the  same.  But  its  child  in  turn,  the  third  generation,  may  split  up 
the  zone  of  consciousness  in  two  so  that  it  has  substituted  two  sounds 
for  one. 

DIAGRAM  I 


First  Generation 

Second  Generation 

Third  Generation 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Variations 

Vowel  heard 

Variations 

Vowels  heard 

Variations 

produced 

and  attempted 

produced 

and  attempted 

produced 

Op 

a 

flp 

a 

dp 

a. 

a 

a. 

a 

a. 

ah 

a 

ah 

a 

ah 

ai 

a 

ai 

d 

di 

Or 

a 

Or 

a 

dr 

a„ 

a 

a«, 

a 

d„ 

20  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

Such  a  difference  of  sharper  distinction  may  also  exist  in  the  case 
of  two  persons  of  the  same  generation.  At  any  rate,  as  soon  as  the 
distinction  is  a  general  one  in  the  majority  of  the  group  there  is  the 
chance  of  the  rapid  development  apart  of  the  two  sound  qualities. 

If  the  position  which  I  have  here  taken  is  correct,  then  one  part 
of  our  question,  namely,  why  is  it  that  so  few  singular  sound  changes 
occur  despite  the  constant  presence  of  singular  tendencies,  has  been 
answered.  But  the  other  part,  why  it  is  that  singular  changes  occur 
in  one  dialect  and  not  in  another,  is  still  left  without  an  answer. 
And  I  do  not  see  how  the  ultimate  reason  for  this  fact  can  be  found 
anywhere  except  in  the  racial  characteristics  of  the  peoples  speaking 
those  dialects.  My  analysis  has  carried  the  problem  only  one  step 
farther  back.  I  have  found  that  where  a  singular  change  starts, 
a  zone  of  variations  has  been  broken  up.  In  place  of  a  consciousness 
of  sameness  for  one  sound,  we  now  have  one  for  two.  The  analysis  of 
the  speech  continuum  has  been  more  minute  so  that  two  types  now 
share  the  place  of  one  before.  But  whence  does  this  finer  sense  for 
distinctions  come?  What  racial  trait  does  it  indicate? 

Sporadic  changes  are  those  that  occur  only  in  one  word  and  not 
in  others  although  similar  phonetic  conditions  may  exist  there.  As 
a  rule  it  is  only  our  incomplete  analysis  or  knowledge  which  causes 
us  to  suppose  such  a  similarity.  Often  we  overlook  the  additional 
conditions  of  increase  or  decrease  in  tempo  or  energy  of  articulation 
which  are  a  constant  accompaniment  of  such  words  and  which  do 
not  appear  in  the  written  documents. 

But  besides  all  possible  variations  of  mechanical  conditions, 
there  is  a  wholly  different  factor  involved  in  changes  characteristic 
of  certain  classes  of  words.  Greetings;  exclamations  of  fear,  wonder, 
and  joy;  curses  and  benedictions;  proper  names — all  these  appear 
to  suffer  more  change  than  other  words.  Not  infrequently  it  happens 
that  these  same  words  if  used  as  a  part  of  a  sentence  retain  their 
regular  form.  As  a  greeting  a  speech  community  may  use  morn  or 
moin,  while  it  pronounces  the  word  as  morning  when  used  as  a  part 
of  a  sentence. 

The  case  is  somewhat  different  with  words  which  are  sometimes 
classed,  rather  vaguely,  as  particles,  auxiliaries,  etc.  and  which 
Meillet  groups  together  under  the  expressive  term  "mots  accessoires" .^* 

^  Meillet,  A.,  Introduction  d  I' etude  comparative  des  langties  Indo-Europeennes,*  13. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  21 

Of  such  a  word  there  may  occur  two  forms  determined  largely 
by  the  sentence  accent,  as  Old  High  German  nio-wiht  and  nicht 
which  have  merged  into  Modern  German  nicht. 

Common  to  both  cases  is  that  the  phonetic  type  of  a  word  has 
been  split  in  consequence  of  a  separation  of  a  particular  attitude, 
called  out  by  a  particular  situation,  from  the  group  of  all  possible 
attitudes.  A  word,  as  I  have  stated  above,  out  of  the  range  of  mean- 
ings determined  by  previous  experience  receives  its  particular  meaning 
through  the  context.  Our  response  towards  it  is  in  part  determined 
by  the  responses  to  the  surrounding  words.  Now  if  it  happens  that 
it  frequently  stands  alone  or  in  a  phrase  as  a  single  response  to  a 
social  situation  (as  a  greeting),  or  if  it  appears  frequently  in  the  same 
function  in  a  sentence  (as  an  auxiliary),  the  particular  reaction  called 
out  by  it  will  become  fixed  as  a  definite  experience  and  separated  as  a 
different  experience  from  the  reactions  which  may  ordinarily  be 
called  out  by  it.  The  word  then  is  no  longer  one,  but  two.  Additional 
conditions,  such  as  accent,  may  then  produce  a  result  in  one,  and 
not  in  the  other. 

A  necessary  preliminary  to  changes  of  this  kind  is  a  specialization 
of  meaning  to  such  a  degree  that  all  or  most  other  possible  meanings 
are  excluded.  To  be  sure,  words  do  assume  all  possible  shades  of 
special  meanings  in  different  situations,  but  those  are  processes 
of  momentary  significance  only.  Such  special  shades  of  meanings 
are  accompanied  by  particular  sound  variations,  which  will  not 
lead  to  a  change,  however,  because  they  counteract  each  other. 
Only  if  one  shade  of  meaning  is  singled  out  so  that  it  becomes  a 
distinct  habitual  response,  the  sound  variation  peculiar  to  this 
meaning  may  lead  to  a  permanent  change,  because  there  are  then  no 
other  variations  to  counteract  it. 

It  is  not  incorrect  then  to  speak  in  such  instances  of  the  change  of  a 
word  in  contrast  to  sound  change,  since  the  word  as  a  whole  has  broken 
away  from  the  'regular'  development  and  follows  its  own  particular 
path.  Strictly  speaking,  the  sound  changes  it  suffers  are  just  as 
'regular'  as  those  of  other  words;  only  they  occur  under  very  singular 
conditions. 

In  connection  with  these  sporadic  changes  it  would  not  be  uninter- 
esting to  mention  an  older  theory  which  tried  to  explain  them  as 
caused  by  a  too  frequent  use  of  the  words.  Friedrich  Schlegel  said 
that  a  word  might  be  smoothed  off  by  much  use  and  circulation 


22  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

just  like  a  coin.  Schuchardt  holds  the  same  view:  "Sehr  selten 
gebrauchte  W drier  hleiben  zurilck,  sehr  hdufig  gebrauchte  eilen  voran."^'^ 
Thus  howdy  would  resemble  the  smooth  nickel,  as  compared  with 
how  do  you  do,  the  coin  that  has  preserved  its  lettering  nicely.  Wechss- 
ler's  reply:  "Wenn  wir  die  Sachlage  vom  Standpunkte  des  Psychologen 
beirachten,  dann  miissen  im  Gegenteil  oft  gebrauchte  Worter  ah  Erinner- 
ungsvorstellungen  oder  Geddchtnisresiduen  umso  fester  geworden  sein^'^^^ 
is  not  quite  to  the  point,  because  we  might  also  say  that  much  re- 
peated articulations  afford  the  singular  tendencies  a  better  chance 
to  differentiate  the  sounds.  Frequency  is  a  factor  in  these  changes, 
but  not  the  only  one,  nor  the  important  one.  Frequency  of  a  particular 
response  may  separate  it  from  other  similar  responses,  i.e.,  one 
particular  shade  of  meaning  from  the  rest,  whereupon  we  may  have 
a  'sporadic'  sound  change.  Mere  frequency  of  the  word  in  all  its 
shades  of  meaning  could  not  produce  such  a  change  on  account  of  the 
counteracting  influence  of  the  varying  conditions. 

One  particular  fact  in  regard  to  these  words  must  not  be  lost  sight 
of.  Greetings,  curses,  and  other  expressions  or  words  that  are  used 
with  a  restriction  to  one  meaning  are  the  objects  of  the  creative 
powers  of  the  speaker  more  often  than  other  words.  Thus  a  form  like 
darned  may  be  due  to  a  special  dissimilation  of  the  nasals  in  damned, 
but  it  may  also  have  been  created  at  one  time  on  the  spur  of  the  mo- 
ment. 

Summary: 

1.  The  word  as  well  as  the  speech  sound  has  a  distinct  psychological 
existence,  although  the  (minor)  responses  called  out  by  them  are 
fused  in  the  (total)  response  called  out  by  hearing  the  entire  sentence. 

2.  The  identity  of  function  of  a  given  speech  sound  under  different 
conditions  gives  rise  to  like  responses  and  consequently  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  sameness  of  that  sound.  Or  in  other  words,  consciousness  of 
sameness  of  a  speech  sound  is  a  unified  response  called  out  by  a 
group  of  similar  sounds  that  possess  an  identity  of  function. 

3.  The  responses  called  out  by  the  variations  of  a  sound  under 
different  conditions  produce  the  consciousness  of  difference,  which 
need  not  be  an  actual  awareness  of  differences. 

2*  Schuchardt,  H.,  Uber  die  Lautgesetze,  24;  cp.  Schlegel,  Fr.,  Sprache  und  Weisheii 
der  Indier,  15;  Thurneysen,  R.,  Die  Etymologie,  20, 
^^  Wechssler,  E.,  op.  cit.,  134. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  23 

4.  A  sound  change  means  that  the  consciousness  of  sameness  of  a 
sound  (identity  of  function)  has  remained  stationary,  while  its 
actual  contents  have  been  shifted. 

5.  A  generic  (spontaneous)  sound  change  is  conditioned  psycholo- 
gically through  the  consciousness  of  sameness  working  towards 
uniformity,  especially  in  the  stage  of  language  acquisition  of  children. 

6.  A  singular  (conditioned)  sound  change  is  conditioned  by  the 
ever  present  possibility  that  the  consciousness  of  sameness  of  a  single 
sound  (in  the  older  generation)  may  appear  as  a  discrimination  of 
tivo  sounds  during  the  stage  of  lanuage  acquisition  (in  the  younger 
generation). 

7.  The  position  of  a  word  in  which  it  occurs  very  frequently  with  a 
definite  shade  of  meaning  may  be  singled  out  through  the  specificity 
of  function  from  the  other  positions  in  which  it  may  assume  a  variety 
of  meanings.  The  counteraction  of  consciousness  of  sameness  is 
then  suspended  and  that  word  may  suffer  a  sporadic  change  when 
functioning  in  that  particular  shade  of  meaning. 


B.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  IMITATION  IN 
SOUND  CHANGE 

I 

The  dogma  of  the  uniformity  of  sound  change  (see  p.  9)  naturally 
was  the  starting  point  for  the  discussion  of  the  question  whether  the 
whole  group  took  part  in  a  sound  change  or  whether  it  originates  in 
one  or  a  few  individuals  and  then  spreads  to  the  rest  by  imitation. 
This  issue  did  not  produce  such  a  clear  division  among  philologists  as 
the  dogma  itself.  On  the  whole  the  more  common  opinion  is  that 
imitation  not  unlike  fashion  causes  one  member  of  the  group  to 
talk  like  the  rest  and  to  follow  the  phonetic  development  of  its 
dialect.  (For  the  following  compare  especially  E.  Wechssler,  debt 
es  Laiitgesetze? ,  176ff ;  and  H.  Oextel,  Lectures  on  The  Study  of  Language, 
136.) 

Whitney  says:  "Not  that  the  speakers  of  a  language  act  in  unison 
and  simultaneously  to  produce  a  given  change.  This  must  begin  in  an 
individual,  or  more  or  less  accordantly  in  a  limited  number  of  indivi- 
duals, and  spread  from  such  example  through  the  community. 
....  What  he  (the  individual)  suggests  by  his  example  must  be 
approved  by  the  imitation  of  his  fellows,  in  order  to  become  lang- 
uage."^® Even  more  definitely  Collitz  states:  "Dze  lautliche  Um- 
wandlung  ....  iihertrdgt  sick  allmdhlich  auf  eine  grosser e  Anzahl  von 
Individuen.  Sie  gefdlU  denen,  welchen  sie  aufgefallen  ist,  sie  ivird 
Mode."^''  This  view  has  had  strong  supporters  in  modern  times. 
Meringer  expressed  himself  in  the  following  drastic  way:  "Ein 
Lautgesetz  ist  um  nichts  merkwiirdiger  als  das  Gesetz  des  roten  Schirmes 
und  schwarzen  Kopftuches  beim  Bauernweib,  der  Krinoline,  der  Puf- 
drmel  zu  andern  Zeiten.'^"^^ 

An  entirely  opposite  view  is  held  by  Rousselot:  ^^La  cause  dS- 
terminante  de  revolution  (phonetique)  est  d'ordre  general;  elle  agit  sur 

»  Whitney,  W.  D.,  article  Philology  in  Encycl.  Brit.  (1911),  v.  XXI,  424. 

*'  Colhtz,  H.,  Anzeigerf.  deutsches  Altertum,  1879, 321;  cp.  also  Miiller,  F.,  Techmer's 
Zeitsckrift,  I,  213;  Bezzenberger,  A.,  Gottinger  gel.  Anzeiger,  1879,  651;  Schuchardt,  H., 
op.  cit.,  12. 

**  Meringer,  K.,Aus  dem  Leben  der  Sprache,  239;  cp.  Meyer-Luebke,  W.,  Grammatik 
der  rumanischen  Sprachen,  I,  69;  Bremer,  O.,  Deutsche  Phonetik,  p.  xiv;  Sievers,  E., 
op.  cit.,  267. 

24 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  25 

la  masse  de  la  population.  C'est  une  sorte  d'epid^mie  cL  laquelle  personne 
n'6chappe."^^  This  evolution  is  prepared  in  the  parents,  but  it  'breaks 
out'  in  the  children:  "Ce  principe  est  dans  V enfant.  Ou  bien  c'est 
une  tendance  absolue  et  hereditaire  qui  le  porle  a  modifier  dans  un  sens 
determine  le  jeu  des  organes  de  la  parole."^°  This  seems  to  be  borne 
out  by  the  facts  observed  by  Rousselot  himself  and  also  by  the  re- 
markable case  presented  by  Gauchat,  who  found  that  the  differences 
between  the  speech  of  two  generations  in  one  Swiss  village  (Charmey) 
were  exactly  paralleled  by  those  found  in  another  village  (Cerniat), 
although  there  was  no  intercourse  between  the  two.^^  It  is  interesting 
also   that   Gauchat  states  emphatically:   '^Nos  matiriaux  n'' of  rent 

aucune    trace    d'influence    personelle J^ai    etudie,    d'une  fagon 

sommaire,  environ  50  langues  individuelles  et  je  n'y  ai  rien  trouvi 
dHndividuel.'^^^  However,  he  does  not  deny  imitation  absolutely; 
he  notices  it  in  cases  of  'infiltration'  from  other  dialects.  But  how 
shall  we  reconcile  his  statement  which  I  have  quoted  with  that  of 
Weigand,  another  careful  observer  of  dialects:  "Die  lautlichen 
Verdnderungen  gehen  vom  Einzelnen  aus"^^?  Can  it  be  possible  that 
linguistic  conditions  in  Roumania  are  so  essentially  different  from 
those  in  French  Switzerland  that  one  could  arrive  at  exactly  opposite 
conclusions?  Hardly  so.  It  seems  that  Gauchat  is  speaking  only  for 
communities  that  lead  a  relatively  secluded  life,  while  Weigand 
devoted  himself  to  a  large  group  of  dialects  where  he  constantly  met 
those  'infiltrations'  which  the  former  has  also  noticed. 

An  intermediary  position  is  taken  by  others.  Oertel,  leaning 
more  towards  one  side  than  the  other,  says:  "Only  a  small  number  of 
linguistic  changes  of  whatever  kind  arise  simultaneously  in  many 
individuals.  The  bulk  originates  in  one  individual  and  gains  currency 
when  imitated  by  others."^*  Wundt's  position  is  somewhat  reversed: 
"Nun  spielt  zwar  die  Nachahmung  im  gesellschaftlichen  Leben  iiberall 
eine  mitwirkende  Rolle  von  nicht  zu  unterschatzender  Bedeutung,  aber 
bei  den  tiefer  greifenden  und  allgemeineren  Verdnderungen  kommt  ihr 
niemals  die  Eauptrolle  zu.     Vielmehr  erweisen  sich  diese  Verdnder- 

"  Rousselot,  J.,  Rev.  des  patois  Gallo-Rom.,  V,  413;  cp.  Meillet,  A.,  op.  cit.,  15, 

"  Rousselot,  J.,  Rev.  des  patois  Gallo-Rom.,  V,  412. 

"  Gauchat,  L.,  op.  cit.,  227. 

^UbU.,  231. 

»  Weigand,  G.,  op.  cit.,  19. 

^  Oertel,  H.,  op.  cit.,  147;  cp.  Delbruck,  B.,  op.  cit.,  98. 


26  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

ungen,  wo  wir  imstande  sind  ihren  Bedingungen  nachzugehen,  regel- 
massig  als  solche,  die  nicht  von  einem  Individuum  und  nicht  einmal 
von  einer  bestimmt  hegrenzten  Zahl  von  Individuen  ausgehen,  sondern 
auf  Einflussen  beruhen,  die  entweder  die  sdmtlichen  Mitglieder  einer 
Gemeinschaft  oder  mindestens  deren  iiberwiegende  Masse  tre^ffen."^^ 
Wechssler  makes  the  distinction  that  a  common  change  is  possible 
only  in  a  small  community  whose  speaking  is  controlled  only  by 
hearing,  while  in  the  written  and  spoken  language  of  a  larger  district, 
the  KoivT}  or  Kultursprache,  we  have  a  single  starting  point  for  a 
change.^® 

It  seems  then  that  the  two  kinds  of  changes  are  existing.  Indeed, 
even  the  historical  material,  aside  from  all  studies  of  modern  con- 
ditions, forces  us  to  account  for  both.  I  shall  call  imitative  a  change 
that  originated  in  one  or  a  few  individuals  and  spread  to  others  by 
imitation;  and  a  change  that  takes  place  through  a  tendency  in 
the  majority  of  the  group  I  shall  call  tendential.  These  terms  are  not 
a  substitution  for  Oertel's  'primary'  and  'secondary'  or  'imitative' 
changes,  since  he  is  evidently  using  these  only  in  regard  to  the  language 
of  the  individual.^^  I  shall  use  the  terms  'tendential'  and  'imitative'  as 
regards  the  language  of  the  group.  This  change  of  terminology  is 
desirable  since,  as  will  be  seen  below,  a  'tendential'  change  affecting 
the  whole  group  is  already  a  compound  of  primary  and  secondary 
changes  as  regards  the  individual. 

There  are  some  important  reasons  why  we  must  postulate  a 
tendency  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  point  out  as  an  active  force 
by  direct  observation.  (If  Gauchat's  observations  (see  p.  25)  could 
be  repeated  in  the  same  villages  at  intervals  of  perhaps  ten  years, 
we  might  then  actually  'observe'  a  tendency.)  If  all  sound  changes 
started  in  individuals  then  the  development  of  a  dialect  would  be 
entirely  haphazard.  We  should  expect  to  find  a  zig-zag  line,  because 
different  individuals  would  add  different  innovations,  which  are  in 
turn  imitated  by  the  rest.  The  historical  material  which  we  possess 
shows  in  many  cases  a  remarkably  straight  line,  which  points  to  a 
persistent  sound  change  in  one  direction  for  many  centuries.  It  is 
inconceivable  that  from  generation  to  generation  individuals  should 

»  Wundt,  W.,  op.  cit.,  22. 
*•  Wechssler,  E.,  op.  cit.,  36. 
»'  Oertel,  H.,  op.  cit.,  136. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  27 

spring  up  who  would  all  produce  innovations  in  the  same  direction, 
or  that  the  rest  of  the  community  should  imitate  only  these  individuals 
and  no  others  who  might  have  produced  other  deviations. 

It  is  therefore  best  to  conceive  of  such  changes  as  being  produced 
by  a  majority  of  the  group.  Furthermore,  since  they  are  spread  out 
over  a  large  period  of  time,  we  must  suppose  a  constant  ultimate 
cause — in  the  last  analysis  perhaps  some  racial  characteristic — 
underlying  the  whole  movement,  in  other  words  a  cause  producing  a 
tendency  to  shift  certain  sounds  in  one  definite  direction. 

Some  members  of  the  group  will  always  be  unproductive,  just 
as  we  always  find  some  that  do  not  exhibit  the  peculiar  traits  of 
the  group.  The  others  probably  will  take  a  more  or  less  active  part  in 
the  tendential  change.  Despite  these  individual  differences  we  always 
have  a  comparative  uniformity  in  the  dialect  of  a  group.  This  process 
of  levelling  out  is  due  to  imitation.  Thus  every  tendential  change  is 
is  in  the  end  a  resultant  of  a  tendency  and  imitation. 

My  own  position  can  be  formulated  thus:  If  we  find  a  change 
that  has  persisted  for  some  time  in  the  same  direction  we  must  suppose 
that  it  is  caused  by  a  tendency  which  affects  a  majority  of  the  group, 
individual  differences  between  the  members  of  the  group  being  leveled 
out  by  imitation. 

Besides  this  partially  tendential  change,  a  purely  imitative  change 
seems  possible,  as  is  in  fact  attested  by  several  historical  instances, 
e.g.,  the  spread  of  the  uvular  r  in  Germany.  Such  changes  take  their 
origin  in  one  or  a  few  individuals  and  may  be  due  to  various  causes, 
to  an  individual  tendency,  to  a  defect  in  articulation,  or  even  to 
mistakes.  As  regards  the  way  in  which  they  affect  the  community 
they  are  purely  imitative.  Again  the  ultimate  cause  is  not  imitation, 
but  some  cause  that  lies  beyond  it,  as  superiority  of  the  leaders, 
class  distinction,  etc.  It  is  due  to  these  that  among  the  many  in- 
dividual innovations  in  a  community  only  a  few  are  selected  and  made 
universal. 

As  to  the  character  of  both  of  these  types,  the  tendential  and  the 
imitative,  we  can  state  with  some  definitness  only  in  regard  to  the 
first  that  it  is  gradual  in  its  movement.  It  may  proceed  faster  or 
slower  under  different  circumstances,  but  hardly  in  leaps  and  bounds. 
That  is,  if  a  tendency  works  at  all,  we  must  expect  a  gradual  shifting, 
say  from  p  to  /,  and  not  a  substitution.     On  the  other  hand  it  is 


28  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

probable  that  an  imitative  change  is  usually  sudden,  i.e.,  proceeds 
by  substitution.  In  the  majority  of  cases,  e.g.,  pure  substitution, 
dissimilation,  some  distant  assimilations — this  is  fairly  certain,  while 
in  others  the  character  is  more  difficult  to  determine,  as  in  umlaut.  At 
any  rate  we  can  say  that  sudden  change  is  always  imitative,  while 
gradual  change  may  be  imitative  or  tendential;  or  tendential  change 
is  always  gradual,  while  imitative  change  is  as  a  rule  though  not 
always,  sudden.  In  case  it  works  in  connection  with  tendential 
change  it  is  always  gradual. 

For  my  purposes  here  I  shall  draw  the  line  a  little  more  roughly 
and  speak  of  pure  imitative  change  as  if  it  were  always  sudden  in 
contrast  to  secondary  imitative  change,  the  complement  of  tendential 
change,  which  is  always  gradual. 

DIAGRAM  II 


Tendency  ^_^_____— Imitation 

tendential  imitative 

i  .-—-'"1 

gradual  *---"  sudden 

The  real  difficulty  for  philology  lies  in  determining  whether  a 
sound  change,  of  which  only  the  beginning  and  end  have  been  re- 
corded, has  been  a  gradual  one  or  whether  it  does  not  go  back  to  a 
sound  substitution  by  a  single  individual  adopted  by  the  rest.  Some 
are  clearly  recognized  as  imitative  changes,  as  the  introduction  of  the 
uvular  r  in  the  dialects  of  many  German  cities.  Others  are  doubtful, 
as  the  German  umlaiil.  Others  are  clearly  recognized  as  tendential, 
as  'Grimm's  Law.' 

II 

The  function  of  imitation  in  speaking  is  twofold. 

L  In  communities  in  which  the  individuals  show  differences 
in  the  amount  of  variations,  i.e.,  where  some  go  further  along  a  certain 
direction  of  an  existing  tendency  than  others,  imitation  has  a  levelling 
effect;  it  causes  the  members  who  are  almost  unaffected  by  the  ten- 
dency to  accept  at  times  the  pronunciation  of  those  who  are  greatly 
affected  and  vice  versa. 

2.  In  a  community  where  an  individual  or  a  number  of  individuals 
have  produced  an  innovation  in  pronunciation,  this  may  be  accepted 
through  imitation  by  the  rest  of  the  community.    What  causes  the 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  29 

other  members  to  imitate  is  a  different  question.  Imitation  is  here 
only  the  immediate  cause,  the  instrument  through  which  a  more 
remote  cause  can  be  active. 

Uniformity  is  the  result  of  imitation  in  both  cases.  In  the  first, 
however,  it  is  a  tendency  producing  the  change,  while  in  the  second 
it  is  imitation,  provided  the  change  has  started  at  some  particular 
point. 

More  clearness  in  regard  to  the  functioning  of  imitation  will  be 
gained  by  analyzing  the  conscious  processes  involved  in  it.  Most 
psychologists^^  regard  imitation  as  an  instinct.  Others  have  rejected 
such  a  theory.  Wundt,  while  rejecting  the  idea  that  imitation  is  an 
instinct  or  some  other  kind  of  special  mental  function,  would  reduce 
the  processes  that  fall  under  this  term  to  an  association  between  af- 
fects and  actions.^^  The  defect  of  such  a  theory  is  that  the  crucial 
point  of  the  question,  namely,  how  the  association,  supposing  its 
existence,  has  come  about,  is  left  unexplained  if  one  does  not  choose 
to  leave  it  entirely  to  accident.  But  there  are  many  cases  where  we 
cannot  assume  a  previous  association  between  feeling  and  action, 
and  where  we  can  do  this,  we  must  wonder  why  such  a  general  feeling, 
say  of  pleasantness,  is  all  that  causes  one  action  in  one  instant  and 
an  entirely  different  one  in  another. 

There  is  one  analysis  of  imitation  which,  besides  covering  a  multi- 
tude of  facts,  though  not  all  as  I  intend  to  demonstrate,  has  the 
advantage  that  it  emphasizes  the  purely  social  character  of  imitation. 
It  is  based  on  the  observation  that  a  person  who  produces  a  social 
stimulation,  especially  a  vocal  gesture,  is  thereby  stimulating  not 
only  another,  but  also  himself,  and  in  response  thereto  he  will 
naturally  fall  into  the  ways  of  acting  like  some  other  self.  In  taking 
the  roles  of  others  as  a  response  to  self  stimulation  we  get  'imitation,' 
this  is  Professor  Mead's  point  of  view.  "The  response  to  the  social 
stimulation  of  the  self  may  be  in  the  role  of  another — we  present 
his  arguments  in  imagination  and  do  it  with  his  intonations  and 
gestures Not  that  we  assume  the  roles  of  others  toward  our- 
selves, because  we  are  subject  to  a  mere  imitative  instinct,  but 
because  in  responding  to  ourselves  we  are  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
taking  the  attitude  of  another  than  the  self  that  is  directly  acting, 

38  James,  W.,  Principles  of  Psychology,  II,  408;  Angell,  J.  R.,  Psychology,  360; 
McDougall,  W.,  Social  Psychology,^^  105. 
3»  Wundt,  W.,  op.  cit.,  39. 


30  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

and  into  this  reaction  there  naturally  flow  the  memory  images  of 
those  responses  of  others  which  were  in  answer  to  like  actions."*" 

It  is  important  to  note  that  such  an  analysis  does  away  with  the 
distinction  between  conscious  and  unconscious  imitation  as  two 
different  types,  for  it  is  clear  that  the  reaction  may  assume  all  kinds 
of  shades  of  awareness,  from  the  'unconscious'  to  the  intentionally 
produced. 

This  taking  of  the  roles  of  others  is  most  dramatic  in  childhood. 
The  child,  if  left  to  himself  will  create  imaginary  companions  to  take 
part  in  the  events  of  his  play.  His  consciousness  is  then  a  stage  on 
which  his  own  self  is  only  one  among  other  actors.  These  may  repre- 
sent persons  of  his  actual  little  community,  or  they  may  be  entirely 
fanciful.  But  even  the  kings,  the  fairies,  and  the  goblins  bear  a  strong 
resemblance  to  those  that  move  in  his  everyday  life. 

During  this  period  the  child  acquires  his  habits  of  articulation. 
This  process  is  not  quite  as  mechanical  as  Watson  supposes.*^  A 
large  part  of  it  is  really  'social,'  i.e.,  depending  on  imitation  in  Meads' 
sense.  The  problems  of  the  succeeding  steps  of  adaptation  and  of  the 
degree  of  exactness  of  adaptation  of  a  child's  language  are  such  that 
can  be  treated  by  close  observation  of  particular  cases  and  by  a 
statistical  method. 

However,  the  problem  to  be  treated  here  is  in  regard  to  the  adapta- 
tion which  is  going  on  in  the  speaking  process  of  an  adult  after  he  has 
mastered  the  language. 

The  child's  play  has  now  been  abandoned.  But  it  is  only  the 
proscenium,  the  wings,  and  the  setting  of  the  stage  that  have  been 
left  behind.  The  acting  has  remained  in  its  essential  traits  and  is 
now  called  thinking.  At  any  moment,  of  course,  a  stage  can  be  re- 
built with  all  the  colors  and  reality  of  childhood  play,  but  it  is  seldom 
that  we  do  so.  Thinking  is  the  social  process  of  converse  brought 
within  one  consciousness.  We  still  have  stimulus  and  response  as 
between  two  selves,  but  these  two  selves  are  now  the  agents  of  but 
one  consciousness;  they  are  actors  whose  personalitites  are  quite 
faded  out  as  compared  with  the  child's  imaginary  playmates.*^ 

*"  Mead,  G.  H.,  Jotir.  Phil.  Psych,  and  Sc.  Meth.,  X,  377. 

"  Watson,  J.  B.,  Behavior,  330. 

«  Mead,  G.  H.,  Jour.  Phil.  Psych,  and  Sc.  Meth.,  X,  377. 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  31 

The  well  known  observation  that  a  child  has  a  greater  adaptability 
to  his  environment,  that  he  learns  a  language  easier  than  an  adult 
has  often  been  referred — and  without  doubt  correctly — to  the  greater 
plasticity  of  his  neural  organism.  But  may  it  not  be  that  the  difference 
in  adaptability  is  also  due  to  the  loss  of  realistic  appearance  of  the 
agents  of  the  'inner  forum'? 

If  we  now  come  to  apply  Professor  Mead's  fundamental  analysis 
of  imitation  to  the  facts  of  sound  change  outlined  above,  we  have  to 
enlarge  his  conception.  Imitation  exists  not  only  where  one's  self 
takes  the  role  of  another,  but  also,  where  he  in  taking  his  own  role 
produces  certain  characteristics  which  were  formerly  not  his  own, 
but  the  other's.  In  the  first  and  fundamental  case  the  entire  response 
is  that  of  the  other;  in  the  second  case  the  major  response — the  utter- 
ance of  the  sentence — is  essentially  his  own  and  yet  it  contains  minor 
responses  belonging  to  the  other  self.  He  has  borrowed  so  to  speak 
for  his  own  action  some  of  the  colors  of  the  make-up  from  the  other 
actor.  In  as  far  as  such  minor  responses,  one  particular  sound  or 
word  or  accent,  are  concerned  we  might  still  speak  of  taking  the  other's 
role,  but  it  seems  better  to  consider  these  modified  processes  as  a 
different  type  of  imitation. 

This  partial  imitation — as  we  may  call  it  in  contrast  to  Professor 
Mead's  total  imitation — is  the  one  with  which  we  are  primarily 
concerned  in  analyzing  the  mechanism  of  sound  changes.  It  appears 
in  two  different  types  accordingly  as  the  character  of  a  sound  change 
is  gradual  or  sudden,  tendential  or  imitative. 

Now  let  us  examine  a  little  more  in  detail  how  one  individual 
imitates  another's  speech,  which  already  contains  the  new  pronun- 
ciation that  is  to  become  a  sound  change. 

In  total  imitation,  i.e.,  in  taking  the  other's  role  entirely,  along 
with  the  familiar  intonation  and  sound  qualitites  of  that  person  a 
new  accentuation  of  a  word  may  be  imitated,  as  address  ior  address*^ 
or  a  new  vowel  quality  as  a  (as  in  father)  for  ce  (as  in  had)  in  a  word 
like  past.  To  the  imitating  individual  all  the  elements  imitated  are 
primarily  those  that  form  the  basis  of  the  consciousness  of  difference. 
I  have  pointed  out  elsewhere  that  consciousness  of  difference  does 
not  imply  an  actual  awareness  of  the  factors  of  differentiation,  it 
only  implies  an  attitude  of  awareness  towards  the  personality  of  the 

^'  Bloomfield,  L.,  The  Study  of  Language,  152. 


32  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

speaker  and  his  emotional  and  physical  status.  To  imitate  totally 
then  means  to  step  into  the  center  of  that  self  towards  whose  speaking 
one  has  responded  frequently  with  a  consciousness  of  difference  and 
to  act  from  that  center  so  that  the  own  self  would  react  again  in  the 
same  way  with  the  same  consciousness  of  difference.  It  means  to 
create  with  one's  own  action  a  response  from  the  self  as  if  another 
well  known  self  were  stimulating  the  own  self. 

When  the  individual  again  takes  his  own  role,  he  of  course  relaxes 
into  his  own  usual  ways  of  speaking.  But  now,  two  things  can  happen. 
He  may  use,  while  always  acting  in  his  own  role,  a  word  like  past 
with  a  new  sound  a  substituted  for  the  old  (b,  and  he  is  usually  aware 
of  such  cases.  Or  he  may  pronounce  a  certain  sound  throughout 
with  the  slightly  different  quality  characteristic  of  the  pronunciation 
of  the  other  speaker,  e.g.,  an  initial  t  as  an  asporated  t;  of  such  cases 
he  is  usually  not  aware. 

These  two  cases  of  'partial'  imitation,  which  are  typical  of  the 
two  sound  changes,  the  imitative  and  the  tendential,  are,  so  it  seems 
to  me,  sufficiently  different  from  Mr.  Mead's  case  of  'total'  imitation 
to  be  treated  as  separate  types,  and  they  are  also  sufficiently  distinct 
from  each  other  to  require  separate  analyses. 

They  may  to  some  extent  depend  on  previous  'total'  imitation,  but 
not  necessarily  so.  For  in  the  first  place,  the  taking  of  the  roles  of 
other  individuals  is  in  ordinary  thinking  a  rather  colorless  process  in 
adult  life  as  compared  with  the  dramatic  realism  of  a  child's  thinking 
or  playing.  And  in  the  second  place  we  often  use  peculiarities  of 
another's  speech  without  having  had  a  chance  to  imitate  him  in 
inner  speech  or  even  in  'thinking  aloud.' 

Ill 

The  first  case  of  partial  imitation  is  prevalent  in  the  kind  of  sound 
change  which  I  have  called  imitative,  i.e.,  where  a  certain  inno- 
vation of  pronunciation  by  one  or  a  few  individuals  is  accepted  by 
the  rest  of  the  community.  Clear  instances  of  this  kind  are  those 
of  substitution. 

Suppose  that  in  a  certain  community  the  older  pronunciation 
oifast  with  cb  (as  in  had)  is  being  replaced  by  a  pronunciation  with  a. 
An  individual  who  is  still  using  the  old  pronunciation  but  hears 
occasionally  the  new,  has  in  his  vocabulary  two  doublets,  i.e.,  two 
words  that  are  slightly  different,  although  they  answer  to  the  same 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  33 

meaning;  one  form  is  in  his  'active'  vocabulary  and  the  other,  the 
new,  in  the  'passive.'  Some  additional  cause,  as  that  of  fashion  for 
instance,  must  then  be  active  to  induce  him  to  use  the  new  word. 
There  may  now  be  a  period  where  the  two  forms  are  used  inter- 
changeably, but  if  that  additional  cause  is  still  activei,  then  the  new 
form  will  soon  gain  the  preponderance  and  replace  the  old  one 
entirely.  Imitation  in  such  a  case  reduces  itself  to  the  substitution  of 
a  response  of  other  individuals  brought  about  by  the  fact  that  both 
responses,  the  one  substituted  and  the  old  one,  fit  one  single  stimulus. 
Awareness  of  such  a  change  is  a  common  characteristic,  since  it 
does  not  take  place  within  the  consciousness  of  sameness  for  one 
sound. 

The  second  case  of  partial  imitation  is  a  necessary  hypothetical 
process  wherever  a  tendential  change  takes  place  as  pointed  out 
before.  This  kind  of  imitation  must  be  supposed  to  work  at  any 
given  time  towards  the  leveling  of  the  variations  caused  by  the  uneven 
strength  with  which  a  tendency  probably  works  in  dififerent  members 
of  the  community. 

In  addition  it  must  be  supposed  to  work  also  between  variations 
that  are  due  not  to  common  tendencies,  but  to  individual  tendencies. 
Any  one  with  a  pronunciation  differing  from  that  of  the  others  is  a 
potential  factor  of  imitative  sound  change  for  the  rest  of  the  com- 
munity. It  is  very  unlikely,  however,  that  he  should  really  cause 
a  common  sound  change,  unless  an  additional  cause  is  active.  His 
own  difference  may  also  be  so  great  that  to  a  hearer's  consciousness  of 
sameness  he  pronounces  a  different  sound  and  consequently  different 
words.  In  such  a  case  an  imitative  change  may  come  about  in  the  way 
already  described,  by  imitation  through  substitution. 

The  second  case  of  partial  imitation  is,  however,  easily  noticeable 
wherever  one  individual  enters  another  community  with  a  dialect 
slightly  different  from  his.  Without  noticing  it  he  undergoes  a  process 
of  transformation  until  he  is  in  all  respects  a  regular  member  of  that 
community.  Since  such  a  case  of  single  absorption  exemplifies  in  my 
opinion  also  the  mechanism  of  leveling,  which  is  an  absorption  of 
each  by  the  rest,  I  shall  try  to  analyze  only  such  an  adaptation  of  one 
individual. 

When  he  enters  the  new  community  the  contents  of  some  of  his 
zones  of  variations  are  slightly  different  from  those  of  the  original 


34  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

members.  His  differences  will  probably  not  be  noticed  as  such  by 
them,  but  they  will  enter  their  consciousness  of  difference  in  regard  to 
his  speech,  just  as  he  has  a  somewhat  uniform  consciousness  of 
difference  in  regard  to  all  the  others.  (Chinese  faces  are  all  alike  to 
us  as  long  as  their  racial  difference  is  responded  to  by  us  as  an  indivi- 
dual difference.) 

Without  doubt  the  type  of  imitation  analyzed  by  Professor  Mead 
will  now  play  an  important  part  in  the  thinking  process  of  the  strang- 
er. The  roles  in  which  he  will  respond  to  his  own  stimulations  will  all 
have  an  aspect  of  uniformity  by  reason  of  that  uniform  consciousness 
of  difference.  Such  an  experience  cannot  be  without  effect  upon 
his  own  actions.  But  it  cannot  be  all,  there  must  still  be  another 
type  of  imitation  when  he  acts  in  his  own  role,  for  it  is  this  which  is 
gradually  transformed.  This  experience  of  taking  the  roles  of  others, 
important  as  it  is,  does  not  seem  to  me  even  necessary  to  bring  about 
the  transformation.  What  is  necessary  only  is  the  hearing  of  the 
speech  of  the  others. 

One  of  the  functions  of  that  complex  of  past  sound  experience 
which  we  may  call  the  auditory  speech  image  is  its  control  of  articula- 
tion. This  does  not  mean  that  an  ordinary  image  actually  precedes 
an  articulation  like  a  picture  set  up  as  a  model.  On  the  contrary,  the 
image  is  usually  merged  in  the  action  and  its  incoming  sensations. 

The  auditory  image  is  not  a  stable  and  perfectly  rigid  thing,  it  is 
a  psychic  process  which  is  compounded  of  past  experience,  especially 
that  of  the  most  recent  and  the  most  vivid.  If  this  experience  varies, 
or  more  precisely,  if  it  shows  a  preponderance  of  a  certain  variation 
in  one  direction,  as  in  hearing  the  sound  /  often  pronounced  /'',  it 
does  not  remain  unaffected,  it  also  changes  in  that  direction.  Whether 
the  hearing  of  others'  or  of  one's  own  pronunciation  plays  the  dom- 
inant part  in  this  experience  is  a  moot  question  and  difficult  to 
determine.  But  at  least  we  are  certain  that  the  whole  of  the  ex- 
perience, including  taking  the  roles  of  others,  is  a  potent  agent  in 
this  respect. 

The  speech  image  thus  affected  will  in  turn  influence  the  articula- 
tion. At  first  the  variation  in  the  direction  of  the  change  will  become 
more  frequent,  and  at  last  the  center  so  to  speak  of  the  zone  of  varia- 
tions will  have  been  moved  in  that  direction. 

Such  a  change  takes  place  unnoticed,  unless  it  is  experienced  by  a 
phonetician  instead  of  an  unsophisticated  individual.    It  is  a  change 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  35 

within  the  consciousness  of  sameness  of  a  sound.    The  response  in 

regard  to  that  particular  sound  will  have  the  same  function  all  the 

time,  and  will  consequently  appear  as  the  'same'  in  consciousness, 

while  its  content  has  actually  undergone  a  transformation.  We  have 

here  then  a  type  of  imitation  which  consists  in  the  change  of  a  response, 

while  its  function  remains  identical,  through  the  modification  of  one 

of  its  controlling  factors. 

DIAGRAM  III 

Imitation 
(taking  the  role  of  another) 


gradual  sudden 

(change  of  controlling  factor  of  response)         (substitution  of  response) 

The  difference  between  this  type  and  the  one  described  above  lies 
in  the  fact  that  here  in  regard  to  its  function  the  response  is  the  same, 
although  slightly  modified  in  contents,  while  there  one  response 
is  substituted  for  another,  both  serving  the  same  function.  This 
difference  accounts  for  the  fact  that  the  element  of  awareness  is  always 
absent  in  the  one  type  and  may  be  present  in  the  other.  Mathematically 
considered,  both  cases  might  be  called  substitutions,  but  processes 
of  consciousness  have  to  be  considered  from  their  own  point  of  view, 
which  is  here  that  of  conduct.  Doing  this  we  find  a  radical  difference: 
Consciousness  of  sameness  of  response,  and  substitution  of  responses. 

The  situation  is  quite  different,  if  our  hypothetical  case  occurs 
in  a  community  whose  speech  contains  sounds  that  are  unfamiliar 
to  the  stranger.  Unfamiliarity  of  a  sound  means  that  it  is  not  con- 
tained in  any  of  the  zones  of  variations  of  the  speaker's  language. 
First  there  will  take  place  the  substitution  of  a  familiar  sound  which 
comes  nearest  in  acoustic  effect  to  that  of  the  unfamiliar  sound  in 
place  of  this  one.  Thus  the  word  that  may  be  pronounced  dat  by  a 
Swede  and  zat  by  an  Italian.  Unless  by  some  additional  process  the 
speaker  learns  the  new  sound,  he  will  not  be  able  to  produce  it. 

The  matter  seems  paradoxical:  A  considerable  variation  which 
can  with  the  proper  guidance  easily  be  detected  by  any  one,  is  not 


36  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language 

imitated,  and  a  slight  one  which  goes  unnoticed  is  imitated.  How  can 
a  modification  be  imitated  that  is  not  perceived  as  such? 

The  answer  lies  in  the  mechanism  of  the  control  of  habitual 
movements  through  the  corresponding  images.  A  zone  of  variations 
of  a  particular  articulation  contains  all  the  possibilities  of  this  set 
of  movements.  This  zone  is  accompanied  by  a  range  of  shades  of 
the  auditory  image  which  is  in  a  certain  sense  parallel  to  it.  The 
proof  for  the  existence  of  such  shades,  although  we  may  not  be  aware 
of  the  difiFerences,  is  afforded  by  the  possibility  of  intentionally 
producing  a  speech  sound  which  fits  only  one  situation,  as  in  the 
case  of  acting  or  other  kinds  of  taking  the  role  of  another.  Now  what 
is  imitated  unnoticed  by  an  individual  in  a  strange  community  must 
already  be  contained  in  his  possibilities  of  articulation,  i.e.,  in  his 
zone  of  variations:  One  particular  shade  of  the  auditory  image  gains 
the  preponderance  over  the  others  and  along  with  it  goes  the  cor- 
responding variation  of  articulation. 

In  the  case  of  an  entirely  diflFerent  and  unfamiliar  sound  there  is 
nothing  in  the  past  experience  of  the  individual  that  can  be  influenced. 
The  imagery  called  out  by  the  sensation,  combining  with  it  to  form 
the  perception,  functions  as  in  any  ordinary  auditory  illusion.  And 
there  can  never  be  an  imitation  until  the  different  articulation  has 
been  produced  by  the  speaker  through  a  process  of  conscious  syn- 
thesis, as  in  foreign  language  instruction  based  on  phonetic  methods. 
A  foreign  language  course  is  full  of  examples  of  this  kind;  it  proves 
this  point  almost  every  day:  Familiar  to  many  is  the  way  in  which 
such  German  sounds,  as  the  so-called  ich  and  ach  sounds  are  acquired 
by  American  students.  The  only  possible  road  is  a  conscious  syn- 
thesis of  the  new  articulation  followed  by  a  constant  drill  until  it 
has  become  a  habit,  i.e.,  a  new  zone  of  variations. 

Summary 

1.  Imitation  is  not  a  specific  process  of  response.  While  there  may 
be  outward  resemblances,  as  the  copying  of  a  model,  different  types 
of  processes,  each  with  its  own  essential  characteristics,  are  found  in 
different  sets  of  cases. 

2.  In  addition  to  the  fundamental  type  (I)  of  'total'  imitation 
analyzed  by  Mead  as  a  process  of  taking  the  roles  of  another,  we  must 
on  the  basis  of  linguistic  facts  recognize  two  partly  related  types  of 
'partial'  imitation;  namely,  (II)  Imitation  through  (conscious)  sub- 


Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Language  37 

stitution  of  one  response  for  another  where  both  fit  the  same  stimulus, 
and  (III)  imitation  through  the  (usually  conscious)  modification  of  the 
controlling  imagery  of  a  response. 

3.  Imitation  through  a  modification  of  the  controlling  speech 
image  can  lead  only  to  an  action  that  has  previously  been  executed; 
a  familiar  sound  can  be  imitated,  but  not  an  unfamiliar  one. 

4.  Gradual  phonetic  change  may  be  both  tendential  and  imitative. 
To  which  of  these  a  certain  sound  change  belongs  must  be  determined 
on  the  basis  of  the  historical  material. 

5.  Tendential  change  is  possible  in  a  majority  of  the  group  while 
the  rest  of  the  group  may  follow  through  imitation,  just  as  the  differ- 
ences between  individuals  will  be  leveled  out  by  this  process.  Imita- 
tion in  this  cases  will  be  of  type  III. 

6.  A  purely  imitative  change  is  usually  a  sudden  change.  After  it 
has  taken  place  in  the  pronunciation  of  one  or  a  few  individuals  it  is 
accepted  through  imitation  by  the  rest  of  the  community,  but  not 
without  some  additional  cause.  Imitation  in  this  case  will  be  of  type 
II. 


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